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In the last twenty years the banking sector of many countries has undergone a period 
of consolidation and restructuring. This has raised concerns about the welfare 
implications of larger credit institutions, given that the banking industry is vital for the 
whole economic system.  
From a theoretical point of view, one should expect two “direct” effects from these 
structural transformations. First of all, consolidation may allow banks to achieve a 
higher level of efficiency thanks to the exploitation of scale and scope economies. 
Secondly, mergers and acquisitions among credit institutions could lead to an increase 
in local market concentration and thus, as maintained by the Structure-Conduct 
Performance (SCP) paradigm, to an increase in banks’ market power.  
In turn, market power in banking is the channel through which the consolidation 
process could have some “indirect effects” on other economic phenomena. Indeed, as 
shown by recent empirical works, the degree of competition in banking markets is a key 
explanatory variable of banks’ X-efficiency, as well as credit availability for small 
firms, relationship banking, economic growth and financial stability.  
In this dissertation we empirically explore some of the consequences of the 
consolidation process, focusing on the Italian banking industry. More precisely, 
Chapter One studies the effect on banks’ cost efficiency. Starting from a Multi-output 
Symmetric Generalized McFadden cost function, we estimate a system of factor 
demand equations in order to assess the degree of scale and scope economies of Italian 
banks in the period 1992-2007. We find evidence of slight economies of scale and 
significant economies of scope. Our main conclusion is that the efficiency gains coming 
from merger and acquisition operations could be an explanation of the consolidation 
process; at the same time, they could translate into beneficial effects for consumers and 
firms, provided that they are not offset by an increased market power. 
In the following chapters we turn to the possible indirect effects of banking 
consolidation. The focus of Chapter Two is on the impact of banks’ monopoly power on 
their X-efficiency. Particularly, we test the so-called “quite life” hypothesis (QLH), 
according to which firms with market power are less efficient. Using data for the period 
1992-2007, we apply a two-step procedure. First, we estimate bank-level cost efficiency 





as a vector of control variables, to explain cost efficiency. Unlike the existing literature 
on the subject, to this end we employ a logistic regression that, in our opinion, is better 
suited to model cost efficiency scores. Our empirical evidence supports the QLH, 
although the impact of market power on efficiency is not particularly remarkable in 
magnitude. 
Finally, in Chapter Three we assess the impact of banks’ market power, and other 
structural variables characterizing banking markets, on local economic growth. Using a 
dataset on the Italian provinces for the period 1999-2006, as well as banks’ balance 
sheets data, we estimate a dynamic panel data model, also taking into account the 
possible spatial dependence among observations. This is a novelty in the empirical 
literature on the finance-growth nexus. Moreover, the use of data on local economies, 
allows us to control more easily for heterogeneity. Our results show a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between banks’ market power and economic 
growth, thus supporting the view according to which competition in banking can be 
detrimental to growth because it tends to reduce credit availability for informationally 
opaque firms. This evidence can have important implications on the Italian economy, 
where the presence of small (usually more opaque) firms is quite relevant. Besides, 
when spatial interactions are accounted for, the impact of local financial development 
disappears, and provincial growth is positively linked to how fast contiguous provinces 
grow. 
Although the three chapters, as explained above, are to some extent linked, they 







Estimating Scale and Scope Economies in Banking: Evidence 







The estimation of scale and scope economies in banking has a long tradition in 
applied economics and the methodology has evolved according to the introduction of 
new functional forms. Not all of these, however, are well suited for assessing cost 
economies and, in particular, economies of scope. 
The most used flexible functional form,1 the translog cost function (TCF),2 suffers 
from two weaknesses. On one hand, it often violates the theoretical property of 
concavity in prices. Although global concavity can be imposed, this destroys the 
flexibility of the TCF.3 On the other hand, it does not admit zero values of outputs, 
since all variables enter in logarithmic form. Then it is not possible to assess economies 
of scope. Several solutions have been proposed to deal with this undesirable 
characteristic of the TCL, none of which is completely satisfactory (Pulley and 
Humphrey, 1993). 
The quadratic cost function, originally proposed by Lau (1974), admits zero output 
values but it cannot be restricted parametrically in order to impose homogeneity and/or 
concavity in input prices without sacrificing its flexibility. The same applies for the 
Generalized-CES-Quadratic cost function introduced by Roller (1990).  
Caves et al. (1980) proposed to use the Box-Cox transformation of the outputs in the 
translog model in order to accommodate zero values. However, empirical applications 
using this cost function show that the parameter of the transformation is nearly zero, so 
that the estimated Generalized translog cost function is a close approximation to the 
                                                 
1 For the definition of flexibility, see Diewert (1974).  
2 The translog functional form has been introduced by Christensen et al. (1973). 
3 See Diewert and Wales (1987). Concavity can also be imposed locally as showed by Ryan and Wales 





translog form. Conversely, the Symmetric Generalized McFadden cost function, 
introduced by Diewert and Wales (1987) and extended to the multi-output framework 
by Kumbhakar (1994), admits zero values for outputs and is globally concave in input 
prices.4 
In this paper we assess scale and scope economies in the Italian banking industry 
over the period 1992-2007. We estimate a system of factor demand equations derived 
from a Multi-product Symmetric Generalized McFadden (MSGM) cost function.5  
Using a panel of banks, we are also able to control for technical change.  
Reliable estimates cost economies in banking are very relevant from a policy point 
of view, due to the consolidation process that has taken place in Italy (as in many other 
countries) in the last twenty years.6  Indeed, an effect (and at the same time a cause) of 
the consolidation could be the exploitation of scale and scope economies by larger and 
more diversified institutions and then lower interest rates on loans. If this is the case, to 
the extent to which those effects are not offset by an increased market power of banks, 
we should expect welfare gains from the ongoing consolidation in the banking industry.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 offers a brief review of the empirical 
literature on banking costs. Section 1.3 discusses the properties of the MSGM and the 
related measures of economies of scale, economies of scope and technical change. The 
dataset is described in Section 1.4, while in Section 1.5 results are presented and 
interpreted. Finally, Section 1.6 draws some conclusions.  
 
 
1.2 A brief review of the literature 
Early studies on costs in the banking industry date back to the mid-1950s. An 
excellent review on this first stage of research can be found in Gilbert (1984). Since 
                                                                                                                                               
imposing curvature conditions locally results in concavity at all points. However, this is less likely to 
happen for larger dataset.  
4 Anyway, concavity can be imposed through a simple reparametrization, without destroying the 
flexibility of the cost function. 
5 To our best knowledge no previous attempts have been made to assess cost economies in banking using 
a MSGM cost function. Barnett et al. (1995) employ this functional form to model banks’ technology but 
in a macroeconomic framework. 
6 To give an idea, in Italy the number of banks reduced from 922 in 1998 to 806 in 2007, while in the 
same period the assets of the whole banking system increased from 1936.71 to 3871.32 billions euro 





then, the methodology has quickly evolved, stimulated by the introduction of new 
functional forms.  
One of the first studies employing a flexible functional form, namely the translog, is 
Benston et al. (1982). They use an aggregated measure of deposits and loans as output 
to estimate economies of scale for U.S. banks over the period 1975-1978. However, if 
one uses a single output specification, the finding of economies of scale could actually 
be due to the presence of economies of scope (Mester, 1987). Moreover, Kim M. (1986) 
tests the existence of a consistent output aggregate for a sample of Israeli banks, 
concluding that a composite measure of output is not able to adequately represent the 
banking technology.  
Murray and White (1983) employ a translog cost function with multiple outputs. 
Using cross-section data on 61 credit institutions in British Columbia for the period 
1976-1977, they find evidence of economies of scale for all banks in the sample, with a 
weak inverse relationship between returns to scale and asset size. Moreover, they find 
strong evidence of cost complementaries between mortgage lending and consumer 
lending.  
Another study using a multi-product translog specification is that of Gilligan et al. 
(1984). The authors use the same data as Benston et al. (1982) but don't find evidence of 
economies of scale. However, like Murray and White (1983), they conclude that 
economies of scope exist, although they define bank output quite differently and use 
data with a lower level of disaggregation. 
Using the parameter estimates of Murray and White, Kim H.Y. (1986) performs a 
richer analysis of credit institution in British Columbia. He observes that the authors 
omit to consider product-specific economies of scale that arise from the production of a 
specific subset of products. Moreover, they estimate cost complementaries, which are a 
sufficient but not necessary condition for economies of scope. Kim finds almost 
constant return to scale for mortgage lending and investments, diseconomies of scale for 
consumer lending, and strong evidence of both overall and product-specific economies 
of scope. 
Cebenoyan (1988) estimates only economies of scale of U.S. banks for the period 





multi-branching banks, he finds evidence of slight diseconomies of scale except for 
1983. 
Using data on 149 Saving and Loans institutions operating in California in 1982, 
Mester (1987) finds no evidence of both economies of scale and scope, but evidence of 
strong substitutability between capital and labour and between labour and demand 
deposits. Moreover, she shows that there are no cost advantages for institutions with 
larger branch networks.  
One of the drawbacks of the translog cost function is that it is not defined at value 
zero for one or more outputs. An alternative is to employ the Generalized translog cost 
function. Lawrence (1989) adopts this type of flexible form to estimate economies of 
scale and scope for a sample of U.S. banks. Using data for the period 1979-1982, he 
cannot reject the hypothesis that there are no economies of scope. 
None of the studies discussed so far control for technical change, being based on 
cross-section data. A study taking into account technical change is due to Hunter and 
Timme (1986). Using a balanced panel of U.S. bank for the period 1972-82 and a 
single-output translog specification, they find that, on average, costs reduced by 15 per 
cent during the sample period because of technical progress. Particularly, these benefits 
were obtained to a larger extent by banks with more branches or higher levels of output.  
Another flexible functional form used in the banking literature is the Fourier cost 
function.7 For example, Mitchell and Onvural (1996) use it to estimate scale and scope 
economies on a sample of about 300 U.S. banks for the years 1986 and 1990. They do 
not find evidence of neither economies of scale nor economies of scope. 
More recent studies, based on models that take into account banks’ risk preferences 
and financial capital, find scale economies for largest banks.8 
Although the cost structure of European banks has not been so extensively studied 
as that of the U.S., the empirical research available is quite mixed. For example, Glass 
and  McKillop (1992) use data from a single Irish bank to estimate economies of scale, 
economies of scope and the rate of technical change for the period 1972-1990. They 
find overall diseconomies of scale, but  product-specific economies for lending. 
                                                 
7 This functional form, introduced by Gallant (1981), combines a translog form with a truncated non-  
parametric Fourier series. 





Estimation results suggest the presence of diseconomies of scope. As regarding 
technical change, they estimate an average annual rate of about 5%, except for the 
period 1975-1977. 
A more comprehensive study on technical change is that of Altunbas et al. (1999). 
The authors estimate a Fourier cost function in a stochastic frontier framework. Using a 
large panel of European banks for the period 1989-1996, they find that the reduction in 
costs due to technical change varied between 2.8% and 3.6% over the sample period, 
with larger banks gaining more benefits. 
Regarding single country studies, Zardkoohi and Kolari (1994) use data on 615 
branch offices of Finnish bank in 1988 to estimate a translog cost model. The findings 
are that larger branches operate more efficiently, especially if they belong to banks with 
large branch networks. Conversely, they do not find evidence of economies of scope. 
Two other studies on European country are Dietsch (1993), who finds scale 
economies for French banks, and Rime and Stiroh (2003), who reports economies of 
scale for small-medium banks and weak evidence of economies of scope in Switzerland. 
For the Italian banking system, the works of Cossutta et al. (1988), Baldini and 
Landi (1990) and Conigliani et al. (1991) show the presence of economies of scale but 
not of economies of scope. The last finding, however, has not been confirmed by more 
recent studies. Cavallo and Rossi (2001) estimate economies of scale and scope on a 
panel data of banks of six European countries. For Italy, they conclude that global 
economies of scale exist especially for small banks. Product specific economies of scale 
are found for deposits and financial investments, and there is evidence of economies of 




In order to estimate scale and scope economies in the Italian banking industry, we 
employ a MSGM cost function. This functional form has been introduced by 





(1987), who in turn generalized the McFadden (1978) cost function. It has been used, 
among others, by Asai (2006), Stewart (2009), and Ivaldi and McCullough (2008).9 
The MSGM with M outputs and N inputs can be written as: 
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where kQ is the k-th output, iW  is the i-th input, t is a time trend,
10 and jk kjd d= . The 








where W  is the N x 1 vector of inputs, S is an N x N negative semidefinite matrix of 
parameters, and θ  is an N x 1 vector of non-negative constants not all zero.  
In order to identify the parameters some restrictions are needed. Firstly, we must 
have 0*SP =  for some vector *P of strictly positive prices. If *P  is chosen to be the 








=∑  for 1i ,...,N= . Secondly, setting 
i i i i iXθ α λ δ= = = = , where iX  is the sample mean of the i-th input quantity, one needs 
to normalize to unity one of the kβ  parameters.
11 In spite of these restrictions, there are 
still enough free parameters for the cost function to be flexible.12 
                                                 
9 The single output specification has been employed, for example, by Kumbhakar (1990), Rask (1995) 
and Nemoto and Goto (2004). 
10 The terms involving t account for technical progress. 









12 See Kumbhakar (1994) for details. Moreover, the MSGM could be made even more flexible – in the 
sense that the number of free parameters is larger than those necessary to ensure flexibility - setting 
i iXθ =  and estimating separately the iα , iλ  and iδ  parameters after normalizing to unity ta , tta  and one 
of the 





Regarding the theoretical properties that a cost function should satisfy, the MSGM 
is linear homogeneous in prices by construction and, as shown by Diewert and Wales 
(1987), the negative semidefiniteness of the S matrix ensures the global concavity in 
prices. If the estimated S is not negative semidefinite, one can easily impose it through 
the reparametrization S HH '= − , where H  is an N x N lower triangular matrix, while 
at the same time maintaining flexibility.13 
By the Shephard’s lemma, i iX C W= ∂ ∂ . Then, starting from (1) we can write the 
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and ( )iS  is the i-th row of the S matrix. Adding a random error iu  to each equation, and 
assuming that ( ) 0E u =  and ( )E uu' Σ= , where [ ]1 Nu u u '= … , one gets a system 
of seemingly unrelated regressions that can be estimated by either the nonlinear and 
iterative version of the Zellner (1962) ’s method or by maximum likelihood. 
With the estimated parameters at hand, and following Baumol et al. (1982), the 


















                                                 





where kη  is the elasticity of the cost function with respect to the k-th output. ESC  is 
the generalization of the conventional measure of scale economies to multi-product 
firms, assuming that all outputs proportionally change. Returns to scale are increasing, 
constant or decreasing according to whether ESC  is, greater than, equal to, or less than 
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Economies of scope come from the joint production of several outputs. They are 















            (7)
 
Thus, ESCP  measures the relative variation in costs due to the combined 
production of the M outputs. There exist economies of scope if 0ESCP > ; indeed, if 
this is the case, the cost of producing the outputs separately is larger than the cost of 
producing them jointly, so the numerator is positive. By the same reasoning, if 
0ESCP < , there exist diseconomies of scope. Finally, if the outputs are disjoint in the 
production process, 0ESCP = .  
The rate of technical change is given by (minus) the growth rate of costs with 





= −  (8)
 
If  this quantity is positive, costs reduce over time at rate RTC thanks to technical 
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To better characterize the production process of Italian banks, we also estimate price 
elasticities of inputs. By definition, the elasticity of input i with respect to the price of 











Starting from (1), we can write: 
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1.4 Data and definition of the variables 
The sample of Italian banks has been drawn from the database Bankscope,14 and 
covers the years 1992-2007. We have selected banks’ balance sheet and profit and loss 
account data only in unconsolidated form (thus treating holding banks and their 
affiliates as separate decisional units). Besides, we have considered only commercial, 
cooperative and popular banks, dropping those observations for which relevant 
variables were not available. As consistency check, the sample has been matched to the 
official list of banks operating in Italy in each year, available from the Bank of Italy. 
We dropped the observations that did not pass this test.  
We follow the intermediation approach to banking costs (Sealey and Lindley, 1977) 
and consider a three outputs-three inputs specification of the system (3). The outputs are 
loans (Q1), other earning assets (Q2), which consist basically of financial assets, and 
                                                 
14 The Bankscope database is distributed by Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing (BvDEP) and is one 






non-traditional activities (Q3), which generate non-interest income. To get an asset 
equivalent measure of non-traditional activities, we use an approach similar to that of 
Boyd and Gertler (1994).15 Assuming that the net non-interest income (NINC) is 
generated from off-balance-sheet assets and that these non-traditional activities yield 
the same rate of return on assets (ROA) of other activities (loans and financial assets), 
we compute Q3 as: 
 
3Q ROA NINC= ⋅  (12)
 
where ( )1 2net interest incomeROA Q Q= + . 
The three inputs are: deposits and other funds (X1), labour (measured as the number 
of employees) (X2), and physical capital (X3).16 The corresponding cost figures are 
therefore interest expenses, personnel expenses, and other operating costs, respectively. 
In order to calculate the last figure, we have subtracted labour costs from all operating 
costs (which are net of financial expenses). 
The price of deposits (W1) is equal to the ratio between interest expenses and the 
sum of deposits, money market funding and other funding. The price of labour (W2) has 
been computed dividing personnel expenses by the number of employees. Finally, the 
price of capital (W3) has been proxied by the ratio between residual operating costs and 
fixed assets. 
We have also checked for the presence of outliers. Observations for which the factor 
prices were lower than the 1st centile or larger than the 99th centile have been dropped. 
Finally, we excluded banks for which less then three observations were available. The 
final sample consists of 6265 observations on 703 banks. The panel is unbalanced, and 
includes about 9 observations for each bank. Table 1.1 provides some descriptive 
statistics of the sample. 
                                                 
15 This approach has also been used by Allen and Liu (2007) and Feng and Serletis (2009). 
16 Following an acknowledged approach in the banking literature, we consider physical capital as a 
variable input. Moreover, Hunter and Timme (1995) found that estimated scale economies are not 





It is worth nothing that Q3 represents, on average, the 26% of total outputs,17 
showing the importance of non-traditional activities in the production process of Italian 
banks. Then, omitting this type of activities could lead to biased results. 
 
 
TABLE 1.1 – Descriptive statistics of the sample 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. 
C (a) 6265 165.43 13.18 0.56 15585.94 726.18 
Q1 (a) 6265 1421.12 137.09 2.45 164391.00 6304.28 
Q2 (a) 6265 948.63 80.23 2.40 140662.90 4625.04 
Q3 (a) 6265 1391.24 69.44 1.76 273951.50 8418.92 
Q1 + Q2 + Q3 6265 3760.99 299.62 13.69 569518.80 18649.69 
W1 (b) 6265 0.0310 0.0246 0.0100 0.0792 0.0167 
W2 (c) 6265 55.00 54.52 35.69 79.83 6.45 
W3 (c) 6265 1.57 1.11 0.31 15.13 1.66 
X1 (a)  6265 2194.90 201.65 5.90 274522.60 10015.33 
X2 (d) 6265 640.16 71 3 48295 2394 
X3 (a) 6265 39.66 3.88 0.08 3117.17 167.99 
S1 (b) 6265 0.4062 0.3963 0.0698 0.7708 0.1096 
S2 (b) 6265 0.2849 0.2828 0.0904 0.5040 0.0634 
S3 (b) 6265 0.3089 0.3056 0.0988 0.7674 0.0754 
SQ1 (b) 6265 0.4395 0.4364 0.0431 0.9651 0.1172 
SQ2 (b) 6265 0.3047 0.3012 0.0077 0.7777 0.1263 
SQ3 (b) 6265 0.2558 0.2500 0.0034 0.6949 0.0869 
(a) Millions euro (2000 values)  -  (b) Ratio  -  (c) Thousands euro (2000 values)  -  (d) Units 
Si  = cost share of input i 




1.5 Estimation results 
The system (3) has been estimated by maximum likelihood.18 Table 1.2 shows the 
parameter estimates.19 In a preliminary estimation, the S matrix was found to be not 
negative semidefinite, then the concavity of the cost function has been imposed by 
reparametrizing and re-estimating the model, as discussed in Section 1.3. However, the 
log-likelihoods of the two models are almost the same.20 Most of the 28 parameters are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. 
                                                 
17 Since all outputs are expressed in (constant) monetary values, we can add them, and compute the share 
of each output to total output. 
18 Note that the cost function does not contain additional parameters with respect to (3); so estimating it 
along with the input demand system is useless. 
19 Estimations have been performed using a program written in GAUSS. 





Table 1.3 shows the R2 for each estimated equation and for the cost function. The 
lower value (0.86) is that of the capital equation, probably because of the imperfect 
measurement of this factor of production by the book value of the fixed assets. 
Although the cost equation has not been included in the estimated system, its goodness 
of fit measure reaches a satisfactory value of  about 0.92.   
 
  TABLE 1.2 – Parameter estimates 
Parameter Coeff. t-value  
s11 -0.04499 -23.51 *** 
s21 0.04828 24.12 *** 
s22 -0.05180 -24.76 *** 
β2 1.00584 84.92 *** 
β3 0.00725 1.25  
b1 -0.05269 -7.00 *** 
b2 0.08231 12.96 *** 
b3 0.00316 3.88 *** 
b11 0.94745 170.45 *** 
b22 0.27736 130.03 *** 
b33 0.02609 107.87 *** 
a11 -0.00185 -2.78 *** 
a21 -0.00079 -2.36 ** 
a31 -0.00059 -15.18 *** 
a12 0.00175 3.03 *** 
a22 -0.02187 -44.23 *** 
a23 -0.00224 -35.71 *** 
a13 0.00064 1.23  
a23 0.00153 6.95 *** 
a33 0.00014 6.07 *** 
at 0.00142 4.35 *** 
d11 0.00059 13.04 *** 
d21 -0.00089 -17.83 *** 
d22 0.00130 13.93 *** 
d31 0.00005 2.31 ** 
d32 -0.00011 -2.75 *** 
d33 0.00002 1.73 * 
att -0.00007 -5.29 *** 
Log-likelihood 6730.67  
N. of observations 6265  
N. of banks 703  
Dependent variable: C. 
*** = significant at the 1% level ; ** = significant at the 5% level; 
* = significant at the 10% level. 






Table 1.4 reports the cost elasticities with respect to outputs, scale and scope 
economies, and the rate of technical change, all computed at the sample means of the 
variables. Among the three outputs considered, loans show the higher cost elasticity. 
More precisely, a 1% increase in the production of loans translates into a 0.66% 
increase in total costs. Conversely, the percentage increase generated by a 1% increase 
in non-traditional activities is very low (0.03%). The sum of cost elasticities with 
respect to output equals to 0.94, implying an estimated value of ESC around 1.07, which 
is very similar to the result (1.09) obtained for Italy by Cavallo and Rossi (2001). This 
indicates that Italian banks have been characterized by slight economies of scale during 
the period under study. However, it is interesting to note that at the average total output, 
which equals to about 3.8 billions euro, economies of scale are not still exhausted.  
The value of ESCP is positive (see Table 1.4), implying the presence of economies 
of scope. Our estimate suggests that producing the three outputs separately translates 
into an increase in total cost of 13.21% with respect to the cost that would result from 
the joint production of all outputs. The sign of this finding is consistent with that of 
Cavallo and Rossi (2001).21  Scope economies, along with a lowering of risk, could 
explain the trend toward a diversification of activities and income sources followed by 
many banks in the last years, even through mergers and acquisitions.  
Finally, the cost of banks reduced over time at an annul rate of 3.63%. This value is 
the same as that estimated by Altunbas et al. (1999) when considering the whole 
European banking system in the period 1989-1996. Then, banks have benefited 
substantially from technical progress.   
Price elasticities of input demands are reported in Table 1.5. Every input demand is 
inelastic with respect to its own price. Labour seems to be the most sensitive factor of 
production to changes in price (-0.11). Conversely, deposits show an elasticity that is 
very close to zero. Regarding cross price elasticities, labour and capital turn out to be 
substitutes; according to our estimates, if the price of capital increases by 1%, the 
demand for labour increases by 0.12%. In the opposite case, that is if the price of labour 
increases by 1%, the demand for capital increases by 0.08%. Also deposits and capital 
                                                 
21 Regarding economies of scope, they report a value of 71.8% (for the whole European banking system), 






are substitutes, but the associated elasticities are much lower.  Finally, deposits and 
labour appear to be complements, although the elasticity is nearly equal to zero. 
Overall, we observe that our model generates lower price elasticities (in absolute 
terms) than those obtained in other studies, such as Hunter and Timme (1995) and Lang 
and Welzel (1998), both employing a translog specification. However, our price 
elasticities are comparable to those estimated by Glass and McKillop (1992) and 
Featherstone and Moss (1994) who used a generalized translog and a normalized 
quadratic cost function, respectively. 
 
 
TABLE 1.3 – Goodness of fit 
Equation R2 
Total Cost (C) 0.9210 
Deposits (X1)  0.9995 
Labour (X2) 0.9626 
Capital (X3) 0.8643 
The R2 values was calculated for each equation as  
1- var(u)/var(Y) where var(u) is the variance of the residuals and 




TABLE 1.4 – Cost economies and technical 
change 
Cost elasticities (CE)  
    Loans (Q1) 0.6677 
    Other earning assets (Q2) 0.2339 
    Non traditional activities (Q3) 0.0336 
Economies of scale (ESC) 1.0693 
Economies of scope (ESCP) 0.1321 




TABLE 1.5 – Price elasticities 





Deposits (X1) -0.0002 -0.0034 0.0037 
Labour (X2) -0.0068 -0.1139 0.1207 









In this paper we have analyzed the production process of the Italian banking 
industry in the period 1992-2007. Using a large dataset on 703 banks, we have 
estimated a MSGM system of factor demand equations in order to assess the degree of 
scale and scope economies and the rate of technical change.  
The major findings can be summarized as follows. There is evidence of slight 
economies of scale. Conversely, cost economies from the joint production of several 
outputs are quite substantial. Finally, we find a reduction in costs due to technical 
change of about 3.63% per year. 
Based on these findings, we can conclude that Italian banks obtained significant 
efficiency gains from the consolidation process. Specifically, this process appears to 
have been driven by cost economies associated to diversification, rather than a 
reduction in costs due to a larger size. From a policy point of view, this result suggests 
that the consolidation process should be beneficial to consumers, especially in view of 
the not remarkable anticompetitive effects of mergers and acquisitions, highlighted by 













During the last two decades the banking sector of many countries has experienced a 
huge consolidation process. This is due to several reasons, such as technological 
progress, globalization, and deregulation of banking markets.1 Regarding Europe, 
crucial factors stimulating the M&A operations have been also the adoption of the 
Second Banking Directive in 1989 and the implementation of the Economic and 
Monetary Union. 
In Italy the number of banks reduced from 922 in 1998 to 806 in 2007, while in the 
same period the assets of the whole banking system increased from 1936.71 to 3871.32 
billions euro.2 This consolidation trend has raised concerns about its welfare 
implications, given that the banking market is vital for the whole economic system. 
Actually, from a theoretical point of view a more concentrated industry could lead to 
greater market power for banks. Thus, many empirical studies have attempted to 
estimate the degree of competition of the banking sector, often using the methodologies 
proposed by the so-called New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO).3  
However, there is a related potential problem stemming from the exploitation of 
market power. It is the possibility, first stressed by Hicks (1935) and known in the 
literature as the “quiet life” hypothesis (QLH), that firms with higher market power put 
less effort in pursuing cost efficiency: instead of taking advantage of their favourable 
position by also cutting costs, in order to gain higher profits, they prefer to enjoy a 
“quite life”. However, as pointed out by Berger and Hannan (1998), there are several 
                                                 
1 See Berger et al. (1999) for a review on causes and implications of consolidation in the financial 
services industry. 
2 Bank of Italy data (current values). 
3 With reference to the European countries see, among others, Molyneux et al. (1994), De Bandt and 




other reasons for which firms with more market power would be less efficient. For 
example, their managers could overexpand some expenses, especially in order to 
preserve market power. 
Surprisingly, this issue has received relatively little attention in the empirical 
literature, and only some recent studies have tried to test the QLH in banking. The aim 
of this paper is to contribute to this stream of literature focusing on the Italian banking 
industry for the period 1992-2007. 
Using a two-step procedure, we first estimate bank-level cost efficiency scores and 
Lerner indices by means of a stochastic frontier model. Then we use the estimated 
market power measures, as well as a vector of control variables, to explain cost 
efficiency, also dealing with the potential endogeneity of the Lerner index. Our results 
support the prediction of the QLH, as banks’ market power appears to negatively affect 
their cost efficiency, even if the overall impact is not particularly remarkable in 
magnitude. This means that the “quiet life” behaviour of Italian banks, although 
existing, does not lead to a noteworthy loss of efficiency. 
Our analysis is characterized by a number of worthy features. First, it considers a 
single country, so that the results of the empirical analysis are more reliable because of 
the homogeneity of various factors (legal, historical, cultural, social) that usually play a 
crucial role in influencing firms’ behaviour but are more difficult to be caught in a 
cross-country framework. Second, we estimate efficiency scores making use of two 
different stochastic frontier models, namely the standard Battese and Coelli (1992) 
methodology and the Aigner et al. (1977) approach, and perform the second step 
estimation by means of both a tobit model (the most widely adopted approach) and a 
logistic model (which, in our view, is more appropriate in this framework). The use of 
various techniques allows to check the robustness of our empirical evidence. Finally, we 
carry out some estimations also for sub-samples of banks, in order to assess possible 
different behaviours according to their type, location and size. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 offers a review of the literature on the 
estimation of market power in banking and the relationship between market power and 
efficiency. The methodologies used to estimate both banks’ market power and cost 




Section 2.5 illustrates data and variables, while the results are presented and discussed 
in Section 2.6. Finally, Section 2.7 draws some conclusions.  
 
 
2.2 Market power, efficiency, and their relationship: a review of the banking 
literature 
At the start, the assessment of competition in banking has been essentially based on 
the “structure-conduct-performance” (SCP) paradigm, first proposed by Mason (1939) 
and Bain (1951), according to which the performance of an industry depends on the 
behaviour of incumbent firms, which in turn is determined by the market structure, 
usually proxied by the level of concentration. 
For the empirical implementation, this paradigm has taken a “structure-
performance” (SP) form, since the standard practice has been to estimate a relationship 
between a measure of performance (in terms of profits or prices) and a concentration 
index.4 In this framework, a statistically significant and positive coefficient of the 
concentration variable is interpreted as evidence of a cooperative behaviour among 
firms that allows them to exploit their market power at expense of customers.  
While such a simplified version of the model can be theoretically justified (e.g. 
Cowling and Waterson, 1976), it has led to undervalue the role of firms’ conduct in 
determining the equilibrium of the industry. The most important challenge to the SP 
hypothesis is the contestability theory of Baumol et al. (1982). According to these 
authors, an industry can reach competitive outcomes, whatever the level of 
concentration, if potential entrants are able to exert an adequate competitive pressure on 
incumbent firms.  
Another criticism to the SP paradigm comes from the “efficient structure” (ES) 
hypothesis, suggested by authors like Demsetz (1973) and Peltzman (1977). They 
remark that a higher level of market concentration could be the result of differences in 
efficiency among firms or across markets. Firms that are more efficient get both higher 
market shares and profits, so that we observe a spurious positive relationship between 
profits and concentration. In other words, the SP and ES hypotheses take different 
                                                 




variables as exogenous: concentration and efficiency, respectively (Berger and Hannan, 
1989). 
Based on the shortcomings of the SCP approach, the New Empirical Industrial 
Organization (NEIO) has developed several methodologies to derive a conduct 
parameter as a measure of the market power exerted by firms. One possibility is to 
estimate a simultaneous model of demand and supply equations, where the conduct 
parameter is represented by a conjectural variation coefficient that can assume different 
values depending on the degree of market power prevailing in the industry. Pioneered 
by Iwata (1974), this approach has been developed by Bresnahan (1982) and Lau 
(1982),5 and applied to the banking sector by many authors. 
Along the line of NEIO, Panzar and Rosse (1987) propose a methodology based on 
the estimation of a reduced form revenue equation, which includes the prices of the 
inputs among the regressors. The sum of the estimated elasticities of revenues to factor 
prices provides the so-called H-statistic, representing a conduct parameter that can 
range from negative values (monopoly or collusion) to one (perfect competition). The 
H-statistic only allows to discriminate among different market hypotheses, but it has 
been shown that, under specified assumptions, this index can be interpreted as a 
continuous measure of competition (Vesala, 1995, p. 56; Bikker and Haaf, 2002, p. 
2203). 
Another NEIO approach for assessing the degree of market power in banking is 
based on the calculation of the Lerner index, where the marginal cost (needed for its 
assessment) is obtained by means of the estimation of a cost function.6 One advantage 
of this methodology is to provide a bank-level measure of market power, whose 
evolution over time can also be easily traced. 
While several empirical studies have focused on the estimation of market power of 
banks, the attention towards its influence on efficiency is much more recent and leads to 
assorted results. 
In general terms, the link between market structure and efficiency was first 
postulated by Hicks (1935), who argued that monopoly power allows managers to enjoy 
                                                 
5 See also Appelbaum (1982). 
6 Examples in this regard are, among others, Fernández de Guevara et al. (2005), Oliver et al. (2006), and 




a share of the monopoly rents in the form of discretionary expenses or less effort, which 
generates inefficiencies and justifies the evidence of a negative relationship between 
market power and efficiency as a consequence of managers’ “quiet life” (i.e. free from 
hard competitive pressures): actually, in a more relaxed environment the search for cost 
efficiency is less severe, at the expense of somewhat lower profits. Because of this slack 
management, firms with greater market power are more inefficient. 
This idea has been challenged on the ground that the owners of monopolistic firms 
could nonetheless exert some control on managerial effort. Therefore, other theories 
have been developed on this subject. For example, Leibenstein (1966) suggests that 
inefficiencies may result from the existence of imperfections in the internal organization 
of firms (“X-inefficiencies”), e.g. due to informational asymmetries or the 
incompleteness of labour contracts. These inefficiencies could be reduced through 
market competition, which provides incentives to managers to exercise more effort and 
also allows the owners to make a better assessment of firm (and managerial) 
performance relative to other companies. An alternative theory is the above mentioned 
“efficient structure” hypothesis by Demsetz (1973), for which there could be a reverse 
causality between competition and cost efficiency. This hypothesis maintains that the 
best-managed firms have the lowest costs and thus gain the largest market shares, which 
leads to an increase in the level of market concentration. In other words, (higher) 
efficiency determines (higher) concentration and (probably lower) competition. 
By means of a theoretical model, Schmidt (1997) shows that an increase in 
competition has two effects on managerial incentives: it increases the probability of 
liquidation, which positively affects managerial effort, but it also reduces firm’s profits, 
which may make the provision of high effort less attractive. Hence, the total effect is 
ambiguous. Empirical evidence of a “quiet life” preference of managers when they are 
protected from takeover threats is found by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), Zhao 
and Chen (2008), Giroud and Mueller (2009), and Qiu and Yu (2009). 
Turning to the banking sector, Berger and Hannan (1998) start from the original 
standpoint of Hicks, according to which «the best of all monopoly profits is a quiet life» 
(Hicks, 1935, p. 8), and are the first to ask whether banks operating in more 
concentrated markets exhibit lower cost efficiency as a consequence of slack 




concentrated markets could allow them to avoid minimizing costs without necessarily 
exiting the industry. This behaviour might result in lower cost efficiency because of 
shirking by managers, the pursuit of objectives other than profit maximization, political 
or other activities to defend or gain market power, or simple incompetence that is 
obscured by the extra profits made available by the exercise of market power (Berger 
and Hannan, 1998, p. 464). In order to test the QLH, Berger and Hannan employ a 
sample of about 5000 U.S. banks for the years from 1980 to 1989, and find that credit 
institutions operating in more concentrated markets (in terms of Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index) are characterized by a lower cost efficiency. 
To our knowledge, there are few other papers that try to explicitly test the presence 
of a “quiet life” behaviour in banking. These studies have generally replaced the HHI 
with the Lerner index as a proxy of market power. Working on a large sample of 
European banks, Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2007) reject the QLH for the 
period 1993-2002. However, unlike Berger and Hannan, they do not take into account 
the potential endogeneity of the Lerner index. 
Koetter et al. (2008) estimate the impact of market power on both cost and profit 
efficiency by means of a sample of about 4,000 U.S. banks from 1986 to 2006, finding a 
significant positive relation between Lerner indices and efficiency: accordingly, the 
evidence is that margins have increased in connection with banks’ effort to improve 
cost and profit efficiency, which implies a rejection of the QLH. Solis and Maudos 
(2008) analyze the Mexican banking system in the period 1993-2005, and are able to 
reject the QLH in the deposits market but not in the loans market. 
Koetter and Vins (2008) consider the German savings banks between 1996 and 
2006, and cannot reject the QLH, since the impact of market power is positive when 
they use profit efficiency scores while it is negative when considering cost efficiency. In 
the latter case, however, the estimated effects of the QLH are small in magnitude. 
Al-Muharrami and Matthews (2009) focus on the Arab Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) banking industry in the period 1993-2002. Their results do not support the QLH, 
since there is little evidence that banks in the more concentrated GCC markets exhibit 
lower technical efficiency. On the contrary, they find confirmation of the basic SCP 
version of the market power hypothesis, where market structure helps to explain 




Finally, Fu and Heffernan (2009) study the relationship between market structure 
and performance in China’s banking system from 1985 to 2002, also testing the 
hypothesis of whether the big four banks enjoy a “quiet life”. No evidence supports this 
conjecture, probably because the rigid regulatory rules governing their activities (e.g. 
branch expansion) and the strict control over interest rates prevented the state banks 
from earning monopoly profits. 
Other papers focusing on efficiency in banking markets also recall and consider the 
possibility of a “quiet life” conduct of credit institutions. While testing the SCP and the 
ES hypotheses for the Taiwan banking market before and after the 1991 liberalization 
policy, Tu and Chen (2000) find that in the years prior to the 1991 this industry has 
appeared to exhibit a kind of regulation-induced quiet-life type of market structure 
(while for the subsequent period their results tend to support the efficiency hypothesis). 
Weill (2004) investigates the link between competition (measured by the Panzar-
Rosse H-statistic) and efficiency in the banking industries of 12 European countries for 
the period 1994-1999. The empirical results provide support to a negative relationship 
between these two variables, and therefore do not corroborate the QLH. 
Using bank level balance sheet data for commercial credit institutions in the major 
European banking markets in the years 2000-2005, Casu and Girardone (2007) employ 
a Granger-type causality test and find a negative causation from efficiency to 
competition, while the reverse causality, although positive, is relatively weak. 
Pruteanu-Podpiera et al. (2008) consider the banking industry of the Czech Republic 
and, after measuring the level and evolution of banking competition between 1994 and 
2005, perform a Granger-causality-type analysis in order to assess the relationship and 
causality between competition and efficiency. Their results reject the QLH and indicate 
a negative relationship between these two variables. Particularly, as competition 
negatively Granger-causes efficiency, they maintain that greater competition, leading to 
an increase in monitoring costs through both a reduction in the length of the customer 
relationship and the presence of economies of scale in the banking sector, determines a 
reduction of banks’ cost efficiency. 
Delis and Tsionas (2009) provide an empirical methodology for the joint estimation 
of efficiency and market power for a sample of European and U.S. banks (years 1999-




estimates of market power that are negatively correlated with efficiency, in line with the 
predictions of the QLH. 
Using data from 821 banks in 60 developing countries over the period 1999-2005, 
Turk Ariss (2010) computes proxies for the degree of market power, bank efficiency 
and bank stability, all estimated at the bank level, with the purpose of investigating how 
different degrees of market power affect bank efficiency and stability in these 
economies. In terms of “quiet life behaviour”, the results are mixed. Regarding costs, a 
positive relationship between the level of costs and market power emerges, which 
seems to support the QLH. On the other side, there is evidence of a direct association 
between market power and profit efficiency, and hence of its confutation. It should be 
noted that an opposite result is reported by Schaeck and Cihak (2008), who work on a 
large dataset of European and U.S. banks covering the years 1995-2005 and establish a 
positive effect of competition on profit efficiency. 
 
 
2.3 Estimation of cost efficiency and market power 
Given the panel structure of our data, we employ the stochastic frontier model of 
Battese and Coelli (1992), which allows to estimate time-varying cost efficiency scores. 
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where i = 1,...,N and t = 1,...,T index banks and time, respectively, C is the total cost, Q 
is the output, Wh are the factor prices, and TREND is a time trend included to take into 
account technical change. Finally, εit = vit + uit is a two-components error term, where vit 




modelled as a function of time, i.e. uit = ui exp[–γ (t–Ti)], where ui is a truncated normal 
distribution with mean μ and variance σu2. 
One shortcoming of the above specification is that it imposes an a priori time path to 
the efficiency scores, which depends on the estimation of the γ  parameter. Therefore, as 
robustness check, for the pooled sample we also estimate the stochastic frontier model 
as suggested by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van Der Broeck (1977), where 
the uit term – assumed to be distributed as a half-normal random variable – is free to 
vary over time without any a priori assumption. 
Regarding the cost function, by symmetry of the Hessian we have αhk = αkh. In order 
to correspond to a well-behaved production technology, the cost function needs to be 
linearly homogeneous, non-decreasing and concave in factor prices, and non-decreasing 
in output. With the symmetry restrictions imposed, necessary and sufficient conditions 
































The cost efficiency scores have been estimated as ( )[ ]ititit uECE ε|exp −= .8 Since 
uit ≥ 0, CEit ranges between 0 and 1, with CEit = 1 characterizing the fully efficient firm.  
Employing the parameters resulting from the estimation of the cost function, we can 




























and the Lerner index as 
 
                                                 
7 We imposed symmetry and homogeneity restrictions during the estimation process, and checked the 
other properties after estimation. 
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where Pit is the price charged on the output. Theoretically, the Lerner index can vary 
between 0 (in case of perfect competition) and 1. 
 
 
2.4 Testing the “quiet life” hypothesis 
We implement the test of the QLH for Italian banks by regressing the cost efficiency 
scores (CE) on the estimated Lerner index (LERNER) as well as a set of market-level 
and bank-level control variables. A negative and statistically significant coefficient of 
the variable LERNER can be interpreted as evidence of the validity of the QLH. 
As market-level variables we consider: 
• the growth rate of GDP (GDPGROWTH). It is included to take into account 
the influence of the business cycle on efficiency. In expanding and dynamic 
markets, banks can count on an increasing flow of demand that, if captured, 
could help to better exploit their (branch and/or network) size and hence 
improve efficiency. At the same time, competition among banks is expected to 
be stronger, so banks need to be prepared to take every opportunity that allows 
to enlarge the clientele, and could be forced to forgo efficiency on the grounds 
of short-run profitability. As a result, we can not anticipate the sign of this 
variable; 
• the population density (POPDENS), given by the number of inhabitants per 
square kilometre. On one hand, in markets with high density of people it 
should be less costly to offer banking services; on the other hand, dealing with 
more customers could generate inefficiencies because of the difficulty of 
meeting all customers’ requirements with good standards. Hence, the sign of 
this variable is not a priori determinable. 
In order to have one value for each of the previous regressors, for all banks that 




weighted according to the distribution of branches.9 As relevant markets, we consider 
the 20 Italian regions. 
The bank-level variables are: 
• the ratio between loans and total assets (LOANASS). Contrary to other bank 
assets (e.g. securities), lending requires more effort and organizational 
capabilities by the staff. If not properly performed, it could therefore generate 
inefficiencies; 
• the deposits to assets ratio (DEPASS). Deposits are the main source of 
financing for banks, but they also ask for a good organization in order to be 
gathered and well managed. For the same reasoning as above, a higher fraction 
of deposits among liabilities could then produce inefficiencies on the cost side. 
As a result, we expect a negative coefficient for this variable too; 
• the natural logarithm of the number of branches (lnBRANCHES). A 
widespread branch network involves the creation and management of a retail 
organization and the work of a possible large number of people. This could 
have a negative (or positive) impact on cost efficiency, depending on the 
coordination and organizational problems (or opportunities) linked to a bigger 
dimension. Under this point of view, branches can be also regarded as a good 
proxy for banks’ size;10 
• the natural logarithm of total assets per branches (lnASSBR). This variable 
measures the average degree of capacity utilization of banks’ branches. If 
economies of scale at the branch level exist, banks that are able to manage 
more assets per office should be more efficient, and this would involve a 
positive sign for the estimated coefficient. 
In addition to these bank-level variables, we also control for the influence of bank 
type and bank location on efficiency. To this purpose, we introduce two groups of zero-
one dummy variables: the first considers whether a given credit institution is a 
commercial, popular or cooperative bank (the latter representing our reference group); 
                                                 
9 For an analogous choice, see Maudos (1998) and Coccorese and Pellecchia (2009). 
10 We prefer to proxy size with branches rather than total assets also because the latters are employed as a 




the second records its location (North-West, North-East, Centre, South; here the first 
variable is assumed as reference).11 
Given that CEit lies between 0 and 1, an estimation using OLS would not be 
appropriate. Hence, some authors12 employ a double-censored tobit specification, in 
accordance with what is suggested by Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000).13  
As discussed in Section 2.2, the ES hypothesis postulates a causal relationship going 
from efficiency to market power. Thus, in our econometric model the variable LERNER 
could be endogenous. To deal with this possibility, besides a standard tobit 
specification, we also estimate an instrumental variables (IV) tobit model, where the 
Lerner index is instrumented using its first lag. Possible endogeneity can be tested by 
means of a Wald test (Wooldridge, 2002, pp. 472 ss.). 
However, the tobit model is appropriate only when bounds on the dependent 
variable stem from non-observability. The fact that the dependent variable can take 
values in a given range is not per se a good motivation to use this type of model 
(Maddala, 1991). This is also the view of McDonald (2009), who shows that, if there 
are no observations for which CEit = 0 or CEit = 1 (as very often happens in empirical 
applications), estimating a double-censored tobit model is the same as estimating a 
linear regression model, since the two likelihood functions coincide.   
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where xit is the same vector of regressors used for the tobit model, β is the vector of 
parameters, and φit is an i.i.d. error term with mean zero and variance σφ2.14 Again, to 
                                                 
11 Banks operating in more than one macro-region have been assigned to the area where they manage the 
higher fraction of branches.  
12 For example, see Koetter et al. (2008) and Turk Ariss (2010). 
13 «Since the dependent variable ... is bounded by zero and one, ... either the dependent variable must be 
transformed prior to estimation or a limited dependent variable estimation technique such as tobit must be 
employed». See Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000), p. 264. 




cope with possible endogeneity problems, we estimate this model also instrumenting the 
Lerner index by its first lag. 
 
 
2.5 Data and variables 
Our sample of Italian banks is drawn from the database Bankscope,15 and covers the 
period 1992-2007. In this database, balance sheet and profit and loss account figures are 
reported for each bank both in consolidated and unconsolidated form.16 We have made 
use only of unconsolidated data, treating holding banks and their affiliates as separate 
decisional units. Since the organizational type was also available, we have selected only 
commercial, cooperative and popular banks, and dropped those observations for which 
relevant variables were not available. 
As consistency check, and in order to include in the sample the number of branches 
of each bank (which is seldom reported in Bankscope), the data have been matched with 
those included in the yearly official lists of operating banks, available from the Bank of 
Italy. We dropped the observations that did not pass this test. 
Following the intermediation approach to banking costs (Sealey and Lindley, 1977), 
the three inputs we consider in the cost function are: deposits, labour, and capital. Cost 
figures corresponding to these inputs are interest expenses, personnel expenses, and 
other operating costs, respectively. The last variable has been computed subtracting 
labour costs from all operating costs (which are net of financial expenses).  
The price of deposits (W1) has been computed dividing interest expenses by the sum 
of deposits, money market funding and other funding. The price of labour (W2) is 
defined as the ratio between personnel expenses and total assets.17 Finally, the price of 
capital (W3) has been set equal to the ratio between the other operating costs and the 
value of the fixed assets. 
                                                 
15 This database is distributed by Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing (BvDEP) and is a widely used 
data source in empirical studies on banking. 
16 The consolidated data refer to holding banks and their affiliates. 




As in Shaffer (1993) and Angelini and Cetorelli (2003), the output (Q) is proxied by 
the value of the total assets. The (single) output price (P) is computed as the ratio 
between total revenues (interest income plus net non-interest income) and total assets. 
In order to correct for outliers, the observations for which the output and/or factor 
prices were lower than the 1st centile or larger than the 99th centile have been dropped. 
We have also discarded those banks for which less then three observations were 
available. After the data selection process, we have been left with 7168 observations on 
714 banks. The panel is unbalanced, due to sample selection, consolidation, new entries 
and bankruptcies. On average, it includes 10 observations for each bank (see Table 2.1). 
Some descriptive statistics regarding the variables used in the two estimation steps 
are provided in Table 2.2. 
 
 
2.6 Estimation results 
Consistent with the standard procedure characterizing the stochastic frontier 
analysis, Equation (1) has been estimated by maximum likelihood. Results for both the 
Battese-Coelli and the pooled stochastic frontier models (Model 1 and 2, respectively) 
are reported in Table 2.3. Almost all the estimated parameters are statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  
Yearly averages of the efficiency scores and the Lerner indices for both models are 
presented in Table 2.4. As expected, cost efficiency scores derived from the Battese-
Coelli model exhibit a clear (decreasing) trend, while those coming from the pooled 
estimation show an irregular pattern over time (see Figure 2.1). 
In contrast, the trend of the Lerner index is clearly upward, indicating that the 
market power of the Italian banks has increased during the time interval under study 
(see Figure 2.2).18 More precisely, the yearly average of the Lerner index ranges 
between 0.16 (in 1992) and 0.34 (in 2007) when considering Model 1, and between 0.15 
and 0.27 for Model 2. 
 
                                                 
18 This finding is consistent with the results (for Italy) of Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2007), who 
employ the Lerner index as a measure of market power, and of Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2007), who use 




TABLE 2.1 – Number of 



















N. of banks 714 




TABLE 2.2 – Descriptive statistics of the sample 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. 
C (a) 7168 162433.5 12223.95 600 15585940 732111.1 
Q (a) 7168 2547782 226353.3 9964.4 330407800 11969220 
W1 (b) 7168 0.0305 0.0242 0.0098 0.0808 0.0169 
W2 (b) 7168 0.0165 0.0161 0.0069 0.0308 0.0042 
W3 (b) 7168 1.5481 1.0922 0.2989 15 1.6162 
P  (b) 7168 0.0704 0.0644 0.0384 0.1284 0.0198 
LOANS (a) 7168 1399569 129349.7 2452.01 164391000 6441203 
DEPOSITS (a) 7168 1551341 126141 3690.64 169595700 7226437 
GDPGROWTH (c) 7168 1.6691 1.5024 -3.2685 9.8626 1.8363 
POPDENS (d) 7168 0.2039 0.1802 0.0357 0.4276 0.1036 
LOANASS (b) 7168 0.5584 0.5536 0.0426 0.9615 0.1497 
DEPASS (b) 7168 0.5738 0.5696 0.0469 0.9130 0.0996 
BRANCHES (e) 7168 48.10 8 1 3142 154.90 
ASSBR (a)  7168 31527.7 27614.4 4982.2 323423 18124.1 










TABLE 2.3 – Maximum likelihood estimates of the cost function 
MODEL 1 (Battese-Coelli) MODEL 2 (pooled) 
Parameter Regressor 
Coeff. t-value  Coeff. t-value  
α0 Constant 0.5145 4.93 *** 0.5055 6.64 *** 
αQ lnQ 1.0018 76.23 *** 1.0259 133.71 *** 
α1 lnW1 0.3028 11.01 *** 0.2924 10.26 *** 
α2 lnW2 0.5957 19.09 *** 0.6713 22.00 *** 
α3 (= 1–α1–α2) lnW3 0.1015 6.26 *** 0.0362 2.43 ** 
αT lnTREND 0.1090 3.99 *** 0.0901 3.15 *** 
αQQ (lnQ)2/2 -0.0002 -0.19  -0.0023 -4.25 *** 
α11 (ln W1)2/2 0.1968 21.50 *** 0.1992 20.46 *** 
α12 lnW1*lnW2 -0.1900 -21.34 *** -0.2015 -21.61 *** 
α13 (= 1–α11–α12) lnW1*lnW3 -0.0067 -1.86 * 0.0023 0.61  
α22 (ln W2)2/2 0.1712 17.17 *** 0.1998 19.53 *** 
α23 (= 1–α12–α22) lnW2*lnW3 0.0188 4.77 *** 0.0017 0.43  
α33 (= α11+2α12+α22) (ln W3)2/2 -0.0121 -4.08 *** -0.0039 -1.49  
αTT (lnTREND)2/2 -0.0524 -7.02 *** -0.0019 -0.29  
αQ1 lnQ*lnW1 0.0038 2.40 ** 0.0038 2.39 ** 
αQ2 lnQ*lnW2 -0.0053 -3.06 *** -0.0061 -3.91 *** 
αQ3 (= –αQ1–αQ2) lnQ*lnW3 0.0015 1.64  0.0024 3.10 *** 
αTQ lnTREND*lnQ -0.0057 -3.58 *** -0.0049 -3.05 *** 
αT1 lnTREND*lnW1 0.0049 0.68  0.0032 0.39  
αT2 lnTREND*lnW2 -0.0090 -1.32  -0.0034 -0.45  
αT3 (= –αT1–αT2) lnTREND*lnW3 0.0041 1.09  0.0003 0.06  
Log-likelihood  8727.62  7704.11   
R2  0.9844  0.9914   
N. obs.  7168  7168   
N. banks  714  714   
Dependent variable: lnC. 
















TABLE 2.4 – Yearly averages 1992-2007 of the cost 
efficiency scores (CE)  and the Lerner indices 
(LERNER) 
Battese-Coelli model Pooled model Year 
CE LERNER CE LERNER 
1992 0.9135 0.1600 0.9395 0.1500 
1993 0.9128 0.2190 0.9025 0.2151 
1994 0.9085 0.1561 0.9165 0.1481 
1995 0.9030 0.2102 0.9198 0.1935 
1996 0.8971 0.2089 0.9290 0.1839 
1997 0.8923 0.2059 0.9271 0.1776 
1998 0.8866 0.2512 0.9226 0.2216 
1999 0.8810 0.2318 0.9076 0.2030 
2000 0.8749 0.2758 0.9135 0.2395 
2001 0.8669 0.2655 0.9171 0.2202 
2002 0.8616 0.2507 0.9230 0.2005 
2003 0.8551 0.2858 0.9085 0.2368 
2004 0.8466 0.3051 0.9106 0.2534 
2005 0.8383 0.3179 0.9002 0.2586 
2006 0.8316 0.3449 0.9125 0.2793 













FIGURE 2.2 – Yearly averages of the Lerner indices (1992 -2007) 
 
 
From Figure 2.3 we can also note that the sample correlation between efficiency 
scores and Lerner indices is negative for both models, foreseeing an inverse relationship 
between these two variables. 
To deepen this issue, which after all represents the core of our paper, we use the cost 
efficiency scores and the Lerner indices, as calculated in the first step from the Battese-
Coelli and the pooled models, so as to estimate the tobit specification by maximum 
likelihood (Tables 2.5 and 2.7) and the logistic specification by non linear least squares 
(Tables 2.6 and 2.8).19 
First of all, in both tobit regressions with instrumental variables the Wald test rejects 
the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the Lerner index, confirming that our measure of 
market power is endogenous. Moreover, the significance of the regressors is only 
slightly influenced by either the first step estimation (Battese-Coelli model vs. pooled 
model) and the second step model specification (tobit vs. logistic). 
For the above reasons, in what follows we mainly focus on the findings of the 
logistic specification with instrumental variables that employs the results derived from 
the Battese-Coelli model (namely, Table 2.6, second and third columns). 
                                                 

















TABLE 2.5 – Estimation results for Model 1 (Battese-Coelli): tobit 
regression 









































































Wald test - 89.95(0.0000) -  
Log-likelihood 12340.65 20697.23 -  
N. obs. 7168 6248  6248  
N. banks 714 713  713  
Dependent variable: CE 
*** = significant at the 1% level ; ** = significant at the 5% level; * = significant at the 
10% level. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust to heteroschedasticity. This Wald 
test is distributed as a chi-square distribution with 1 degree of freedom (P-value in 
parenthesis). A constant and time dummies are included in all estimations but are not 
reported. In the IV tobit model, LERNER has been instrumented by its first lag. 













TABLE 2.6 – Estimation results for Model 1 (Battese-Coelli): logistic 
regression 









































































Sum of squared residuals 13.2621 11.7117 -  
N. obs. 7168 6248  6248  
N. banks 714 713  713  
Dependent variable: CE 
*** = significant at the 1% level ; ** = significant at the 5% level; * = significant at the 10% level. 
Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust to heteroschedasticity. A constant and time dummies are 
included in all estimations but are not reported. In the IV logistic model, LERNER has been 
instrumented by its first lag. 







TABLE 2.7 – Estimation results for Model 2 (pooled): tobit regression 









































































Wald test - 7.77(0.0053) -  
Log-likelihood 11665.18 19754.19 -  
N. obs. 7168 6248  6248  
N. banks 714 713  713  
Dependent variable: CE 
*** = significant at the 1% level ; ** = significant at the 5% level; * = significant at the 
10% level. 
Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust to heteroschedasticity. This Wald test is 
distributed as a chi-square distribution with 1 degree of freedom (P-value in parenthesis). 
A constant and time dummies are included in all estimations but are not reported. In the 
IV tobit model, LERNER has been instrumented by its first lag. 














TABLE 2.8 – Estimation results for Model 2 (pooled): logistic regression 









































































Sum of squared residuals 15.6550 13.3568 -  
N. obs. 7168 6248  6248  
N. banks 714 713  713  
Dependent variable: CE 
*** = significant at the 1% level ; ** = significant at the 5% level; * = significant at the 10% level. 
Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust to heteroschedasticity. A constant and time dummies are 
included in all estimations but are not reported. In the IV logistic model, LERNER has been 
instrumented by its first lag. 




The coefficient of LERNER is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level in 
all specifications. This finding strongly supports the “quiet life” hypothesis: as for 
Italian banks higher Lerner indices are associated with cost inefficiencies, market power 
seems to reduce the incentives to minimize costs. This can be due to the fact that 
managers put less effort in their working activities, or even pursue objectives other than 
cost minimization. 
For the logistic regression based on the Battese-Coelli model, the estimated value of 
the LERNER coefficient amounts to -2.43 (-0.29 when employing the tobit 




market power on efficiency, it is preferable to take into consideration the elasticity of 
the cost efficiency scores (CE) with respect to the Lerner index, and in general to the 
covariates, at their sample means (last columns of Tables from 2.5 to 2.8). 
The elasticity associated to LERNER shows that a 1% increase in the Lerner index 
determines a decrease in the efficiency score, on average, of 0.087% (0.09% for the 
tobit model). This value is similar to those obtained by Koetter and Vins (2008) for 
German banks, which range between 0.072% and 0.092%, depending on their model 
specification. Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2007) and Solis and Maudos (2008) 
obtain smaller (absolute) values for the loan market (0.0029% and 0.013%, 
respectively), while Turk Ariss (2010) finds that for developing countries a 1% increase 
in the degree of market power reduces bank cost efficiency by 2.26%. 
Still considering Table 2.6, the above value of elasticity implies that, if the Lerner 
index increases by 22% from 0.2660 (the overall mean of the estimated Lerner index for 
our sample) to 0.3245 (the third quartile), all else equal, cost efficiency scores should 
fall of about 1.91%, i.e. it should decrease from about 0.8670 (again the overall mean) 
to 0.8504, a value corresponding to the 35th centile. This implies that the effects of a 
“quiet life” behaviour from banks (econometrically supported by our estimations) are, 
however, not remarkably large in magnitude. In other words, even if Italian banks 
gained a considerable degree of market power, this would not generate a notable loss of 
efficiency. 
Regarding the control variables, the coefficient of GDPGROWTH is never 
significant, implying that the rate of local GDP growth does not affect cost efficiency of 
banks. On the contrary, population density (POPDENS) appears to have a significant 
negative impact on cost efficiency: so, given that more crowded markets are associated 
to lower levels of efficiency, the positive effect linked to the possibility of reaching 
larger groups of customers in an easier way is more than offset by the greater 
complexity of such packed markets. 
Turning to the bank-level variables, the coefficient of the loans to assets ratio 
(LOANASS) is negative and highly significant. Thus, there is evidence that banks with a 
higher proportion of loans experience a lower cost efficiency, probably as a 
consequence of the tougher organizational problems that lending entails. The impact of 




10% level, confirming the idea that, as their size increases, they impose efficiency 
losses to banks. Quite to contrary, the ownership and management of a wider retail 
activity, proxied by the number of branches, positively affects banks efficiency, as the 
sign of lnBRANCHES shows: this is an evidence that a larger network size allows banks 
to reach higher levels of efficiency, at least on the cost side. This is probably due to the 
fact that Italian banks are generally small-size enterprises, so a bigger dimension allows 
an improvement in the quality of organization and management. Finally, the variable 
lnASSBR shows a positive sign, which is however significant only at the 10% level 
when using the Battese-Coelli efficiency score: overall, this result seems to support the 
idea that banks are more efficient also when they are able to exploit scale economies at 
the branch level. 
Considering the institutional dummy variables, both COMMERCIAL and POPULAR 
exhibit negative and significant coefficients: it follows that, ceteris paribus, they are 
less efficient than cooperative banks. With regard to the geographical localization, from 
the estimated coefficients (all significant at the 1% level) it emerges that banks 
operating in the North-East are the most efficient, followed by those located in the 
North-West, Centre and South, respectively. This result confirms that being positioned 
in more developed regions (both in infrastructural and economic terms) helps banks to 
improve cost efficiency, and once more stresses that in Italy there is a sharp contrast 
between Northern and Southern regions in terms of social and economic development. 
To investigate whether the impact of market power on cost efficiency changes 
according to type, location or size of banks, we have also estimated the instrumental 
variables version of the logistic model on several sub-samples of our data. 
Regarding the type, we have considered three different groups of banks 
(commercial, cooperative, popular). About location, we have divided banks along with 
the macro-region where they operate (North-West, North-East, Centre, South). With 
reference to size, we have classified banks in three groups: small (when total assets are 
less than 100,000 euro, in constant values), medium (total assets between 100,000 and 
500,000 euro), large (total assets exceeding 500,000 euro). 
Tables 2.9, 2.10 and 2.11 report the elasticities of LERNER with respect to CE 






TABLE 2.9 – Elasticity of LERNER  by bank type 













Elasticities refer to the IV logistic model. 
Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust to heteroschedasticity. 
 
 
TABLE 2.10 – Elasticity of LERNER  by bank location 

















Elasticities refer to the IV logistic model. 
Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust to heteroschedasticity. 
 
 
TABLE 2.11 – Elasticity of LERNER  by bank size 













Elasticities refer to the IV logistic model. 
Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust to heteroschedasticity. 
 
 
All elasticities based on the Battese-Coelli model are negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level: this means that the QLH holds whatever the type or location 
or size of banks. We note that for cooperative banks the elasticity (-0.122) is more than 




more efficient on average (see before), performs worse in presence of market power. 
The reason could be that they are generally small-sized banks with a strong propensity 
to long-term lending relationships with small businesses within the local markets: in 
case of an increase of their market power they would be therefore characterized by a 
greater loss of efficiency, because they can nonetheless count on a stable clientele. 
Actually, in Italy the historical role of cooperative banks (and also rural banks) has 
always been to provide credit to information-intensive borrowers (Usai and Vannini, 
2005, p. 703). As a consequence, they are able to benefit of consolidated and close 
relationships with customers, due to private information and repeated interactions over 
time. This result is coherent with the fact that the elasticity for cooperative banks is 
broadly comparable in magnitude with that characterizing small banks (-0.125). Quite 
to contrary, large banks appear to be those who benefit less from a “quiet-life” 
behaviour, since their elasticity amounts to -0.056; not surprisingly, this value is very 
close to the elasticity of commercial banks (-0.055), because big credit institutions are 
mostly classified as such. 
In terms of location, we discover an increase of elasticity moving from Northern to 
Southern regions. This means that market power in banking is able to generate cost 
inefficiencies in the South of Italy to a larger extent, while Northern banks are more 
efficient both as a whole (see above) and notwithstanding the possible exploiting of 
market power.  
The previous findings are confirmed by the results based on the pooled model. All 
the estimated elasticities are negative and highly significant, except for popular banks. 
The elasticity of cooperative banks is again larger than that of both commercial and 
popular banks, although the gap is less evident. The difference between elasticities is 
also smaller when considering location and size. However, the largest elasticities again 




The aim of this paper was to empirically verify the so-called “quiet life” hypothesis, 




management behaviour. We have considered the Italian banking system in the period 
1992-2007, during which a huge process of consolidation has taken place: among the 
others, it could have strengthened banks’ market power, inducing, in turn, a fall in the 
level of cost efficiency in a sector of great importance for the whole economic system. 
To this purpose, we have followed a two-step procedure. First, we have estimated 
bank-level cost efficiency scores and Lerner indices through a translog stochastic 
frontier model, finding that, while cost efficiency seems to have remained stable (or 
even decreased), market power has been characterized by an increasing tendency over 
time.  
Second, we have used the Lerner indices, along with a set of both market-level and 
bank-level variables, to explain the efficiency scores, dealing at the same time with 
possible endogeneity of this market power measure by means of instrumental variables. 
Moreover, together with a tobit regression, we have estimated also a logistic model, 
which is, in our opinion, more suitable when dealing with dependent variables that 
range between 0 and 1 but are not censored. 
Our findings are however robust with respect to model specification, and suggest a 
negative and highly significant relationship between cost efficiency and market power, 
therefore confirming the “quite life hypothesis”. On average, cost efficiency scores fall 
by about 0.09% as the Lerner index rises by 1%. We also find that small banks, 
cooperative banks and Southern banks exhibit a more pronounced “quite life” conduct. 
Since the impact of market power on efficiency does exist, even if small in 
magnitude, our results suggest that Antitrust authorities should be however watchful 
about possible anticompetitive effects of the recent process of consolidation in the 
Italian banking industry, not only because of the reduced degree of competition that a 
greater concentration could induce, but also for the reason that an increase in market 
power could imply lower levels of cost efficiency for banks belonging to a particular 












The role of the financial system in promoting economic growth has been the subject 
of many studies since a long time. While from a theoretical point of view there is no 
consensus on the sign of the relationship, a large body of empirical research supports 
the idea that countries with more developed financial systems grow more rapidly. 
However, cross-country studies suffer from several shortcomings. First, it is hard to 
control for heterogeneity in legal, political and institutional factors, even when panel 
data techniques are employed. Second, the mechanism through which a higher financial 
development should foster economic growth has not been clearly identified, especially 
when the role of the banking system is not explicitly accounted for. Actually, many 
theoretical models show that the structure of the banking markets or the degree of 
monopoly power exerted by banks can affect economic growth. Moreover, the ability of 
banks in allocating resources to good investment projects may be a crucial factor for 
economic development. Third, the spatial aspects of the phenomenon are generally not 
considered. While the literature on convergence abounds in studies that take into 
account the possibility of diffusion and spillover effects, the analyses on the finance-
growth nexus almost completely ignore them. 
The novelty of this paper is to assess the impact of financial development on growth 
tackling all the three above mentioned shortcomings. To this purpose, we employ a 
dataset concerning the Italian provinces1 that covers the period 1999-2006. This allows 
us to focus on small economic areas that share the same institutional and 
macroeconomic environment, thus dealing more easily with heterogeneity.  
                                                 
1 In Italy, the province (provincia) is an administrative district that comprises a larger town or city and 
several little neighbouring towns. Since 1995, in Italy the number of provinces has been 103. In 2001, 
four new provinces have been created in Sardinia (one of the 20 regions in which provinces are further 
grouped), but they have been considered in the statistics of ISTAT (the Italian National Institute of 
Statistics) only starting from 2006. Italian regions and provinces correspond to the Eurostat NUTS-2 and 




Moreover, we control for market power and other variables characterizing the local 
banking markets, and model the potential transmission mechanisms among areas by 
means of a dynamic spatial panel model. From a policy point of view, it is worth 
studying economic growth at the local level because many countries show sharp 
differences among regions in terms of economic and social development, so that 
understanding the determinants of local growth can contribute to reduce such gaps.  
The main result of our analysis is that economic growth is positively influenced by 
banks’ market power. This evidence is consistent with some of the literature on 
relationship lending, which holds that credit institutions need to exert a certain degree 
of market power in order to keep long-term relations with informationally opaque 
customers, as is the case of small firms, which have been always considered the 
backbone of the Italian economy. We also find a positive impact of financial deepening 
on growth, which however disappears when spatial dependence is accounted in the 
model. The latter finding highlights the importance of controlling for this aspect when 
dealing with regional topics. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the literature on finance and 
growth, with particular emphasis on the contributions exploring the role of the banking 
systems. Section 3.3 introduces the model and the econometric methodology, while 
Section 3.4 illustrates how we construct the variables measuring banks’ market power 
and efficiency. Data and estimation results are presented and discussed in Sections 3.5 
and 3.6, respectively. Finally, Section 3.7 summarizes our main findings and draws 
some conclusions. 
 
3.2 Banking market structure, financial development and growth: review of the 
literature 
Economists discuss about the role of financial development in promoting growth 
since a long time.2 From a theoretical point of view, several authors have shown that the 
financial system can promote economic growth through several channels, such as 
raising the proportion of resources allocated to capital and avoiding its premature 
                                                 




liquidation (Bencivenga and Smith, 1991), gathering and using information to direct 
funds towards the most profitable investments (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990), 
reducing, through diversification, the risk associated to specialization and productivity 
growth (Saint-Paul, 1992). Moreover, a large body of empirical literature has tried to 
test the role of financial development, showing that there exists a positive and 
statistically significant link between finance and economic growth.3 
However, most of this literature assumes that the banking system is perfectly 
competitive, while monopoly power is implicitly considered as harmful to growth 
because it entails higher interest rates and a lower supply of credit. This conventional 
wisdom has been recently challenged. In this regard, two groups of models can be 
identified: partial equilibrium models and general equilibrium models (Guzman, 2000a; 
Coccorese, 2008a). 
Partial equilibrium models focus on specific aspects of the lending relationship and 
are not concerned with the overall economic impact of the particular banking industry 
structure. Hence, they recognize the primary role played by banks when relationship 
lending matters, i.e. when closer ties between lenders (banks) and borrowers (firms or 
households) can help to overcome the informational asymmetries that characterize debt 
contracts.4 In this framework, firms are able to get credit more easily, with beneficial 
effects on economic growth.  
However, the effect of market power on this kind of relationships is ambiguous. As 
discussed by Petersen and Rajan (1995), banks with market power are more willing to 
lend, since they can extract rents from firms in the future and therefore overcome the 
initial uncertainty about the credit worthiness of their clientele; conversely, in more 
competitive banking markets this uncertainty is resolved by charging higher interest 
rates since the beginning of the relationship, with the consequence that young, 
distressed or, more generally, informationally opaque firms have to suffer higher 
funding costs or even the impossibility of accessing bank credit.  
On the other hand, a higher level of banking competition, by reducing profit margins 
of credit institutions, could induce them to invest more heavily in relationship banking 
                                                 
3 Among others, see King and Levine (1993), Levin and Zervos (1998), Rajan and Zingales (1998), Beck 
et al. (2000), Beck and Levine (2004), and Loayza and Rancière (2006). 




in order to lock in their clients and alleviate the competitive pressure of other banks 
(Boot and Thakor, 2000; Yafeh and Yosha, 2001). 
Caminal and Matutes (2002) highlight another effect of banks’ market power on 
economic growth, still due to the informational asymmetries. In their model, in order to 
overcome moral hazard problems, banks can choose between restricting loan size and 
increasing monitoring effort. As banks’ market power increases, the credit granted to 
unmonitored firms reduces, but the monitoring effort increases, thus reducing firms’ 
credit constraints. Overall, the effect of market power on investments is therefore 
ambiguous. 
The empirical evidence for this type of models is also mixed. Consistently with their 
theory, Petersen and Rajan (1995) find that U.S. young firms get more credit than old 
ones when banking markets are more concentrated. Moreover, in such markets interest 
rates increase with the age of firms. Likewise, Ogura and Yamori (2009), using data on 
Japanese prefectures, discover a negative correlation between lending competition and 
relationship banking, especially in the case of small firms. Quite the opposite, the 
evidence of other studies is that competition promotes relationship banking. For 
example, Neuberger et al. (2008) consider Swiss small and medium-sized enterprises in 
1996 and 2002 and find that the number of banking relationships is essentially driven by 
the firm and industry structure, rather than the concentration of banking markets. Using 
data on loan contracts of five German banks, Elsas (2005) finds an inverted U-shaped 
link between concentration (measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of local debt 
markets) and the probability for a bank to be engaged in a relationship banking. Hence, 
for low levels of the Herfindhal-Hirschman index (HHI), this probability reduces with 
concentration, while the opposite happens for high levels of the HHI. 
General equilibrium models consider both loans and deposits, and emphasize the 
influence of the banking market structure on the economy at expense of details on the 
relationship between banks and borrowers. So, while the link between banking market 
structure and growth is explicitly modelled, they overshadow the informational 
asymmetries characterizing the borrower-lender relationship. 
Among them, Cetorelli (1997) studies a dynamic model of capital accumulation and 
compares the economic performance of both a perfectly competitive credit market and a 




they are not able to establish long-lasting relationships with firms that could allow them 
to recover the selection costs. For opposite reasons, monopolistic banks perform a 
screening activity and thus allocate credit to better quality projects and borrowers; as a 
consequence, capital accumulation and growth are enhanced. If this positive effect is 
not offset by the inefficiencies due to monopoly, one should expect that market power 
in banking is beneficial to growth.5 
  An opposite conclusion is reached by Guzman (2000b), who proposes a model 
with monitoring and credit rationing. He shows that market power in banking reduces 
capital accumulation and growth because either credit rationing problems are 
exacerbated or, if credit rationing is not present, a monopolistic bank wastes resources 
in monitoring activity in order to meet the higher default probability of borrowers, given 
the higher interest rates it charges. 
Deidda and Fattouh (2005) build a general equilibrium model without asymmetric 
information, where banking concentration impacts on growth through scale and 
specialization economies. As concentration decreases, the average cost of financial 
intermediation reduces with beneficial effects on growth; on the other hand, the 
increased number of banks associated with the lower level of concentration causes a 
duplication of fixed costs, which impacts negatively on growth. If the level of income is 
sufficiently high, the latter effect prevails, and less concentrated markets imply lower 
growth rates of the economy. 
Turning to the (scarce) empirical evidence on the relationship between market 
power and efficiency in banking and economic development, Jayaratne and Strahan 
(1996) show that the removal of intrastate branching restrictions has boosted economic 
growth. However, they surprisingly find evidence of a post-reform better loan quality 
rather than an increase in lending, concluding that the better growth performance has 
been driven essentially by an improvement in the screening and monitoring of 
investment projects. 
In order to test whether the structure of the banking industry impacts on growth, 
Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) make use of the cross-country approach of Rajan and 
Zingales (1998). They include the sum of market shares (measured in total assets) of the 
three and the five largest banks of the various countries in the original dataset, and find 
                                                 




that, on the whole, a higher level of concentration is detrimental to growth, although 
this effect impacts differently across industrial sectors. Particularly, more concentrated 
banking markets facilitate access to credit to younger and more innovative firms, 
allowing them to grow faster. The authors interpret this finding as evidence that 
concentration promotes relationship lending. 
Claessens and Laeven (2005) perform a similar analysis but employ an estimated 
measure of banking competition, i.e. the so-called H-statistic introduced by Panzar and 
Rosse (1987). Their results show a positive effect of banking competition on growth for 
those sectors that are more dependent from external finance. 
Using a database considering companies of different size for 74 countries, Beck et 
al. (2004) focus on the effect of concentration on access to credit for firms. They find 
that entrepreneurs face more difficulties in accessing to credit when banking markets 
are more concentrated, although this effect decreases with firms’ size and is not 
significant for more developed countries. 
On the whole, the empirical literature reviewed so far seems to support the view 
according to which banks’ market power causes higher costs and less availability of 
credit for firms, with the result that it negatively impacts on economic development and 
growth. A contrasting result is obtained by Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2006). 
They use data on 53 sectors in 21 countries for the years 1993-2003 and several 
measures of market power (concentration index, H-statistic, Lerner index). The 
evidence is that market power enhances growth of those sectors that are more dependent 
from external finance, thus giving support to the literature on relationship lending. 
Fernández de Guevara and Maudos (2009) apply the same methodology to firm-level 
data for 52 Spanish provinces in the period 1997-2003, and find an inverted-U 
relationship between market power and sectors’ growth, so that the positive effect of the 
former on economic growth is the highest at intermediate values. 
Turning to Italy, Lucchetti et al. (2001) observe that the traditional measures of 
financial development are able to capture the role of banks in channelling saving into 
capital accumulation, but omit to consider their importance in screening investment 
projects. Hence, they suggest to proxy this crucial function of banks by considering 




Italian regions for the period 1982-1994, they prove that regional economies in which 
banks are less cost-efficient grow slower. 
Another single-country study focusing on Italy, and trying to assess the role that 
specific categories of banks have played in the economic growth of Italian regions, is 
that of Usai and Vannini (2005). They concentrate on regional data for the years 1970-
1993, and discover that, unlike larger banks, cooperative banks and special credit 
institutions have had a special importance in favouring the growth of local economies. 
Finally, Coccorese (2008a) studies the link between concentration in banking and 
economic growth for the Italian regions by means of a Granger-causality test. He finds 
that in the short-run higher levels of concentration negatively affect the economic 
performance of local areas, while in the long-run this causality is reversed since 
economic growth is found to reduce banks’ market shares and hence concentration. 
 
 
3.3 The econometric model 
To assess the impact of banks’ market power and other banking variables on 
regional growth, we start from the following model: 
 
tmtmtmtmtmtm xyyy ,,1,1,, ' εγμβα ++++=− −−    (m = 1,...,M; t = 2,...,T) (1)
 
where M is the number of provinces, T is the number of time periods, ym,t is the natural 
logarithm of real per capita value added in province m at year t,6 xm,t is a K×1 vector of 
variables affecting economic growth, μm is a province-specific fixed effects, γt is a 
vector of time dummy variables, and εm,t  is an error term with mean zero and variance 
σε2. 
The vector x includes the following variables: 
• the ratio between the credit to the private sector and the valued added 
(FINANCE); 
                                                 





• the degree of market power exerted by banks operating in a given province 
(LERNER);7  
• the level of cost efficiency of the provincial banking system (EFF);8 
• the bad loans to total loans ratio (BADLOANS); 
• the number of branches per 100 square kilometer (BRDENS); 
• the ratio between the sum of import and export and the value added 
(TRADE); 
• the ratio between the number of students enrolled at upper secondary school 
and the population aged between 14 and 19 years (HUMCAP);9 
• the ratio between the number of crimes denounced to the judicial authorities 
and local population (CRIME). 
In line with the evidence of the existing literature, we expect the variable FINANCE 
to positively affect the growth rate of the per capita value added. The variables 
LERNER, EFF, BADLOANS and BRDENS are included to capture some factors that 
could affect the role of banks in directing savings toward investment projects. As 
already discussed, the market power of banks is regarded as a crucial determinant of 
both cost and availability of credit for firms, and thus of economic growth. The 
variables EFF and BADLOANS aim at catching the ability of local banks to turn 
deposits into profitable investments by means of effective screening and monitoring 
activities. Particularly, higher levels of cost efficiency are expected to foster economic 
growth, while a larger fraction of bad loans may reflect banks’ poor ability to select 
good projects, with a negative impact on growth. Finally, the variable BRDENS is added 
to capture the potential of lending throughout the province. Degryse and Ongena 
(2005), for instance, provide evidence that the cost of credit increases with the distance 
between firms and banks. Accordingly, in our framework a higher density of branches 
should positively affect investment and growth. 
                                                 
7 Recent studies on banking competition have shown that concentration and the degree of monopoly are 
not interchangeable. Then, in order to proxy for market power we avoid the use of a concentration index. 
8 Details about the methodology used to construct both this variable and the previous one (LERNER) can 
be found in Section 3.4. 
9 In Italy, the secondary education consists of a lower secondary school, which is compulsory and 
provides a basic level of education, and an upper secondary school, which is more advanced and intended 





The variables TRADE, HUMCAP and CRIME help to consider additional features of 
local economies that could influence growth: TRADE measures the provincial openness 
to trade, and should therefore exhibit a positive coefficient; HUMCAP is a proxy of the 
human capital, whose impact on the level of economic activity is generally positive; 
CRIME is added because it is by and large believed to negatively affect economic 
growth by influencing return on investments and business profitability. 
We can rewrite Equation (1) as: 
 
tmtmtmtmtm xyy ,,1,, '~ εγμβα ++++= −    (m = 1,...,M; t = 2,...,T) (2)
 
where α~  = α + 1. 
Equation (2), which is our basic specification, represents a dynamic panel data 
model. Standard assumption for this model are: 1) α~  < 1; 2) E(μm) = E(εm,t) = E(μm εm,t) 
= 0, i.e. both the individual effect and the error term have mean zero and are 
uncorrelated each other; 3) E(εm,t εm,s) = 0, ∀ t ≠ s, i.e. there is no serial correlation 
(Blundell and Bond, 1998). 
Taking first differences of both sides of Equation (2) allows to remove the 
unobserved heterogeneity. The model thus becomes: 
 
tmttmtmtm xyy ,,1,, '
~ εγβα Δ+Δ+Δ+Δ=Δ −    (m = 1,...,M; t = 3,...,T) (3)
 
Since Δym,t-1 and Δεm,t are correlated, estimating (3) by means of OLS would lead to 
biased and inconsistent results (Nickell, 1981). As proposed by Anderson and Hsiao 
(1981, 1982), one possible solution is to instrument the first difference of the lagged 
dependent variable, Δym,t-1, by ym,t-2 or Δym,t-2 (which, under the above assumptions, are 
valid instruments) and apply the 2SLS estimator. 
Developing this idea and the work of Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988), Arellano and Bond 
(1991) note that the Anderson-Hsiao estimator lacks of efficiency because it does not 
make use of all the available instruments, and suggest the use of a GMM framework to 




“Difference GMM” because it consists in applying GMM after first-differencing the 
data in order to eliminate the fixed effects. 
In the case of a simple AR(1) model,10 the following (T–2)(T–1)/2 moment 
conditions can be used for each m: 
 
( ) 0,, =Δ− tmjtmyE ε    (t = 3,...,T; j = 2,...,t–1) , (4)
 




































Z  .  (5)
 
Given this matrix, the one step and the two-step GMM estimators can be applied 
along the lines developed by Hansen (1982).11 Both are consistent and asymptotically 
normal for large N and fixed T, but the two-step estimator is more efficient when errors 
are not i.i.d. 
Additional endogenous covariates other than the lagged dependent variable can be 
easily handled in the same way, i.e. using their second and higher order lags as 
instruments.12 The validity of the overidentifying restrictions, and thus of the 
instruments, can be tested by the Sargan/Hansen statistic, which is given by the value of 
the GMM objective function at the efficient GMM estimator. Under the null of joint 
validity of all overidentifying restrictions, the statistic is distributed as χ2 with L–K 
degrees of freedom, where L is the number of instruments. 
                                                 
10 One example of an AR(1) model is Equation (2) without both the x covariates and time dummies. 
11 Particularly, given the MA serial correlation of the differenced errors, the weight matrix of the one-step 



















where H is a (T–2)×(T–2) matrix with 2’s on the main diagonal, –1’s on the first off-diagonals, and 0 
elsewhere. 




However, if the εm,t’s are serially correlated, some lags would be endogenous and 
could not be used as instruments. For this reason, Arellano and Bond (1991) develop a 
test for autocorrelation in the differenced errors. Since Δεm,t and Δεm,t-1 are negatively 
correlated by construction, the validity of second and higher order lags as instruments 
requires the absence of serial correlation of order 2 in the differenced errors. If this is 
not the case, one should start from higher order lags than the second in building the 
instruments matrix Zm (Bond, 2002). 
Blundell and Bond (1998) show that the lagged-level instruments in the Difference 
GMM estimator become weak as the autoregressive process happens to be too persistent 
or the ratio of the variance of the panel-level effect, μm, to the variance of the 
idiosyncratic error, εi,t, becomes too large. Hence, under mild additional assumptions, 
they develop a “System GMM” estimator that augments Difference GMM by estimating 
simultaneously in differences and levels, the two equations being distinctly 
instrumented. More precisely, the System GMM employs moment conditions in which 
lagged differences are used as instruments for the level equation in addition to the 
moment conditions of lagged levels as instruments for the differenced equation. 
Both the Difference and System GMM easily allow to deal with multiple 
endogenous variables, because there is no need to look for the “right” instruments. All 
one has to do is to use lagged values of the potentially endogenous variables, and then 
test their validity. 
However, this approach can lead to an instruments proliferation, since their number 
increases with the number of the instrumented variables and with T. As discussed by 
Roodman (2009), this has two main practical consequences on the small sample 
performance of the two estimators. First, as already noted by Arellano and Bond (1991), 
too many instruments can cause a downward bias in the two-step standard errors. 
Secondly, the Sargan/Hansen test is weakened in the sense that it does not reject the 
null too often.  
While the first problem can be dealt with using the small sample correction 
proposed by Windmeijer (2005), the second necessarily calls for a reduction of the 
number of instruments. This can be done either using a limited number of lags as 




no information is lost. Operationally, it amounts to exploiting the following moment 
conditions: 
 
( ) 0,, =Δ− tmjtmyE ε    ( j = 2, ..., t–1),  (6)
 



































Z  . (7)
 
One innovative feature of our analysis is that we try to take into account the 
geographic nature of our dataset by also estimating a spatial augmented version of 
Equation (2). Actually, when dealing with regional data the presence of either spatial 
heterogeneity or spatial dependence among cross-sectional units is an aspect that needs 
careful consideration. 
Spatial heterogeneity refers to the possibility that the economic relationships are not 
stable over space. Essentially, this is the well known econometric notion of 
heterogeneity extended to a geographic framework; so, spatial heterogeneity can be 
handled by way of tools such as random coefficients, switching regressions, space 
varying parameters, or panel data techniques. 
Spatial dependence implies that observations at a given location depend on 
observations at other locations. This may occur because of measurement error problems 
or, more importantly, because human activities are naturally linked across space, giving 
rise to diffusion and spillover effects.13 
Spatial unobserved heterogeneity should not be a concern in our model, thanks to 
the inclusion of provincial-level fixed effects, and to the fact that we employ a dataset 
on small local economies that share the same social and institutional environment. 
                                                 
13 See Anselin (1988) for an outstanding treatment of these and related concepts, as well as the models 




Spatial dependence is modeled by including the spatial lag of the dependent variable 







,,1,, '~ εγμβρα +++++= ∑
=
−    (m = 1,...,M; t = 2,...,T) , (8)
 
where ρ is the spatial autoregressive parameter, and wm,n is the generic element of the 
M×M matrix W that describes the exogenous spatial interactions among the various 
cross-sectional units. We can rewrite Equation (8) in the following more compact form: 
 
[ ] tmtmtmmttmtm xWYyy ,,1,, '~ εγμβρα +++++= −    (m = 1,...,M; t = 2,...,T) , (9)
 
where 1t ,t M ,tY y y
′= ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ , while [ ]mtWY  denotes the m-th row of  the WYt matrix. 
In spatial econometrics, it is a common practice to standardize the rows of W, so 
that each of them sums to one. As a consequence, the spatial lag, [WYt]m, is nothing but 
a weighted average of the per capita value added of the neighboring provinces, with the 
ρ parameter measuring its impact on the per capita value added of the m-th province. 
Rewriting Equation (9) in reduced form makes evident that the spatial lag is 
endogenous, since it is a linear combination of the error terms. 
Taking first differences of (9) allows to remove the individual fixed effects, so we 
get: 
 
[ ] tmttmmttmtm xWYyy ,,1,, '~ εγβρα Δ+Δ+Δ+Δ+Δ=Δ −    (m = 1,...,M; t = 3,...,T) (10)
 
Although ML or QML estimators are available for dealing with models like (10) 
(Elhorst, 2005; Yu et al., 2008), both suffer from the drawback that they do not allow 
endogenous covariates other than time and spatial lags. 
An alternative approach would be that of Badinger at al. (2004), who apply the 
GMM estimator after a first-step filtering procedure on the data in order to remove 
spatial autocorrelation. However, as noted by Abreu et al. (2005), the properties of this 
two-stage estimator are not known; in addition, the filtering procedure could remove to 




Given the non-availability of proper estimators for dynamic spatial lag models, 
Kukenova and Monteiro (2008) investigate the finite sample properties of several 
estimators for such models using Monte-Carlo simulations, and suggest to apply a 
system-GMM estimator, instrumenting the spatial lag like any other endogenous 
variable in the model. 
This approach has been used, for instance, by Madariaga and Poncet (2007), Hong 
et al. (2008) and Bode et al. (2009) to study the spatial effects of foreign direct 
investments, by Foucault et al. (2008) for checking possible public spending 
interactions between neighbouring municipalities, and by Mitze (2009) to model 
migration flows.  
We conform to this recent literature and estimate Equation (9) by means of a 
system-GMM procedure (relying on its good small sample properties for spatial 
dynamic panel models). Since the results could depend on the specification of the 
spatial interactions matrix, W, we consider the following three alternatives: 
1) a matrix W1 with generic element )exp( ,
)1(
, nmnm dw −= , where dm,n is the 
Euclidean distance between the capitals of provinces m and n; 
2) a matrix W2 with generic element 1)2( , =nmw  if provinces m and n share a common 
border, and 0)2( , =nmw  otherwise; 
3) a matrix W3 whose generic element, )3( ,nmw , equals to the length of the border 
shared by provinces m and n. 
Using W1 means to assume that the per capita value added of province m is 
influenced by the per capita value added of all other Italian provinces, although this 
influence decreases with distance. In the case of W2 and W3, only the neighboring 
provinces impact on value added of the m-th province. Particularly, while the former 
implies that the weights used in computing the spatial lag are the same for all 
neighboring provinces, i.e. only contiguity matters, in the latter the impact of a given 







3.4 Estimating efficiency and market power 
To get LERNER and EFF variables on a provincial basis, we first estimate bank-
level measures of market power and efficiency. 
Cost efficiency scores and technology parameters are estimated using the following 
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where i = 1,...,N and t = 1,...,T index banks and time, respectively, C measures the total 
cost, Q the output, Wh the factor prices, and TREND is a time trend included to account 
for technical change. Finally, εit = vit + uit is a two-components error term, where vit is 
the usual error term – with vit ∼ N(0,σv2) – and uit is the inefficiency term. Given the 
panel structure of our data, the latter is modelled using the Battese and Coelli (1992) 
parametrization, i.e. uit = ui exp[–γ (t–Ti)], where ui is a truncated normal distribution 
with mean μ  and variance σu2. 
One shortcoming of this specification is that it imposes an a priori time path to the 
efficiency scores, which depends on the estimation of the γ parameter. Therefore, we 
check the robustness of results by estimating for the pooled sample also the stochastic 
frontier model as proposed by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van Der Broeck 
(1977), where the uit term – assumed to be distributed as a half-normal random variable 
– is free to vary over time without any previous assumption. 
With reference to the cost function, the symmetry of the Hessian implies that 
αhk = αkh. In order to conform to a well-behaved production technology, the cost 
function needs to be linearly homogeneous, non-decreasing and concave in factor 




necessary and sufficient conditions for our translog cost specification to be linearly 
































The cost efficiency scores are estimated as ( )[ ]ititit uEEFF ε|exp −= .15 Since uit ≥ 0, 
EFFit ranges between 0 and 1, with EFFit = 1 characterizing the fully efficient firm. 
We compute the marginal cost for each bank and time period by means of the 




































MCPLERNER −=  (13)
 
 
where Pit is the observed price (i.e. interest rate) charged on the output by bank i in year 
t. Theoretically, the Lerner index can vary between 0 (in case of perfect competition) 
and 1. 
Once obtained the bank-level efficiency scores and Lerner indices, we compute the 
corresponding provincial-level measures as weighted averages based on the 
                                                 
14 We imposed symmetry and homogeneity restrictions during the estimation process, and checked the 
other properties after estimation. 




geographical distribution of banks’ branches. More formally, the market power exerted 



































where BRit is the number of branches of bank i in year t, and Nmt is the number of banks 
operating in province m in year t. 
Similarly, the cost efficiency score of the m-th province’s banking system in year t 



































The above expressions are based on the assumption that pricing behaviour, 
technology and cost efficiency of each bank are the same for every province where it 
operates. We understand that this is a quite strong assumption. Unfortunately, balance-
sheet data at a local level are not available. Moreover, it is rather common in studies 
regarding the banking systems of European countries to rely on the branch distribution 
in order to investigate the conditions of local markets. For instance, several authors16 
have computed local HHI indexes considering branches, rather than loans or deposits, 
while others17 have used the distribution of branches to disaggregate balance-sheet 
items. On the other hand, our approach resembles that of Lucchetti et al. (2001), who 
employ it to build an efficiency index of Italian regional banking systems. 
 
 
                                                 
16 For example, see Maudos (1998), Degryse and Ongena (2005), and Coccorese and Pellecchia (2009). 






The sample of Italian banks used to estimate the bank-level cost efficiency scores 
and Lerner indices is drawn from the database Bankscope,18 and covers the years 1996-
2006. We have selected banks’ balance sheet and profit and loss account data only in 
unconsolidated form (thus treating holding banks and their affiliates as separate 
decisional units). Besides, we have considered only commercial, cooperative and 
popular banks, dropping those observations for which relevant variables were not 
available. In order to record the number of branches of each bank (which is seldom 
reported in Bankscope), the data have been matched with those yearly available from 
the Bank of Italy. We dropped the observations that did not pass this test. 
We follow the intermediation approach to banking costs,19 and consider three inputs 
in the cost function: deposits, labour, and capital. The corresponding cost figures are 
therefore interest expenses, personnel expenses, and other operating costs, respectively. 
In order to calculate the last figure, we have subtracted labour costs from all operating 
costs (which are net of financial expenses).  
The price of deposits (W1) is equal to the ratio between interest expenses and the 
sum of deposits, money market funding and other funding. The price of labour (W2) has 
been computed dividing personnel expenses by total assets.20 Finally, the price of 
capital (W3) has been proxied by the ratio between residual operating costs. 
In assessing the level of output Q, we have conformed to Shaffer (1993) and 
Angelini and Cetorelli (2003), and set it equal to the value of the total assets. The output 
price P has been then computed as the ratio between total revenues (interest income 
plus net non-interest income) and total assets.  
We have corrected for outliers by dropping those observations for which the output 
and/or factor prices were lower than the 1st centile or larger than the 99th centile. We 
have also discarded those banks for which less then three observations were available. 
After the data selection process, 4473 observations on 631 banks were available. The 
                                                 
18 The Bankscope database is distributed by Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing (BvDEP) and is a 
common data source for empirical studies on banking. 
19 See Sealey and Lindley (1977). 




panel is unbalanced, and includes about 7 observations for bank (see Table 3.1). 
Descriptive statistics of the sample of banks are provided in Table 3.2. 
 
 
TABLE 3.1 – Number of 











N. of banks 631 






TABLE 3.2 – Descriptive statistics of the sample (bank-level variables) 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. 
C (a) 4473 92870.55 9498.27 613.15 10442791 472540.4 
Q (a) 4473 1896699 198711.8 10251.95 199886016 9985811 
W1 (b) 4473 0.0204 0.0201 0.0088 0.0381 0.0054 
W2 (b) 4473 0.0153 0.0151 0.0064 0.0270 0.0035 
W3 (b) 4473 1.6343 1.1176 0.2958 18.0000 1.8434 
P  (b) 4473 0.0588 0.0584 0.0356 0.0914 0.009 
LOANS (a) 4473 1145054 117380.20 2816.54 116151816 5640632 
DEPOSITS (a) 4473 1120592 107818.20 5173 110769440 5888268 
BRANCHES (c) 4473 41.65 8 1 2845 147.67 




The coverage of the sample, in terms of branches by province and year, is reported 
in Table 3.3. This information is crucial for assessing the reliability of our provincial 
market power and efficiency measures, as calculated by (14) and (15). If the coverage 
were low, these measures would not be accurate. As Table 3.3 shows, there is a very 
small number of pairs province/year for which the branch share of the banks included in 




TABLE 3.3 – Coverage of the sample in terms of branches (percentages) 
PROVINCE 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Agrigento 83.24 60.23 74.57 69.82 92.98 92.81 91.07 97.60 
Alessandria 83.78 66.42 75.18 81.82 70.32 75.35 76.04 93.22 
Ancona 93.08 84.56 84.93 91.97 84.76 85.19 87.72 88.98 
Aosta 82.56 46.15 76.34 82.29 47.92 63.16 65.63 91.75 
Arezzo 96.70 66.31 72.02 95.00 96.60 75.48 94.31 62.27 
Ascoli Piceno 93.78 86.89 87.67 94.22 93.01 94.09 95.51 91.86 
Asti 96.45 77.62 93.84 90.73 77.63 79.33 80.54 97.39 
Avellino 79.66 66.12 75.41 81.30 67.20 71.77 72.66 74.81 
Bari 75.70 58.46 65.48 88.14 74.69 74.83 74.27 79.19 
Belluno 77.25 80.34 82.12 88.59 57.59 59.90 60.42 93.91 
Benevento 92.31 60.00 68.75 54.88 57.83 53.01 64.63 79.07 
Bergamo 81.36 69.23 82.26 94.19 68.53 72.12 91.27 89.77 
Biella 69.35 56.45 61.90 60.32 50.39 52.76 53.54 68.75 
Bologna 85.17 66.05 69.94 94.17 72.69 74.26 73.68 88.40 
Bolzano 90.36 67.00 70.30 94.28 92.59 94.06 93.09 93.61 
Brescia 77.55 70.10 77.31 86.66 79.97 82.27 80.12 81.63 
Brindisi 80.95 65.42 68.47 92.86 74.36 76.27 76.27 76.67 
Cagliari 83.13 64.82 64.20 91.22 87.07 86.89 84.01 48.16 
Caltanissetta 77.01 73.33 79.78 72.83 100.00 95.83 98.98 100.00 
Campobasso 88.51 61.70 70.87 76.92 83.02 80.19 84.26 79.25 
Caserta 83.61 57.53 57.14 81.25 56.61 56.99 56.70 57.00 
Catania 77.32 70.25 74.10 66.57 88.60 89.34 87.43 89.52 
Catanzaro 89.13 63.83 60.82 95.92 84.69 84.69 85.00 89.22 
Chieti 92.59 82.64 79.61 91.08 91.98 92.26 93.60 86.36 
Como 68.58 48.08 60.95 85.45 85.07 92.54 92.69 75.36 
Cosenza 86.31 78.36 72.53 94.62 89.42 89.01 88.27 90.50 
Cremona 69.53 40.42 74.10 85.43 84.25 84.82 85.93 85.09 
Crotone 94.74 85.00 80.00 100.00 86.84 86.84 87.18 92.11 
Cuneo 93.98 82.20 90.24 88.55 78.11 79.88 80.78 94.01 
Enna 93.55 75.81 79.03 61.54 90.91 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Ferrara 82.98 86.29 87.44 95.73 86.32 86.73 86.05 59.45 
Firenze 89.89 69.98 75.30 89.08 88.50 88.52 88.91 69.67 
Foggia 91.47 74.19 78.26 90.72 74.79 69.87 70.12 84.30 
Forlì-Cesena 86.81 91.52 92.20 97.67 80.52 81.23 80.31 91.27 
Frosinone 78.57 26.54 37.20 40.96 81.55 85.47 74.72 75.96 
Genova 69.37 45.88 24.17 44.99 55.76 83.33 82.93 90.04 
Gorizia 84.09 75.28 86.32 95.88 82.86 84.91 85.98 97.17 
Grosseto 95.69 55.00 56.10 90.63 88.46 85.29 91.30 83.10 
Imperia 68.69 51.52 36.54 61.68 54.72 79.09 79.31 89.08 
Isernia 93.10 53.13 60.61 71.88 78.79 78.79 78.79 85.29 
La Spezia 79.51 68.80 59.06 72.87 68.99 87.69 85.50 93.94 
L'Aquila 80.83 84.09 84.56 92.31 95.14 94.44 95.97 84.31 
Latina 96.45 40.14 44.74 64.74 90.80 86.67 73.81 86.63 
Lecce 89.29 78.02 80.66 94.80 73.02 73.31 72.66 82.81 
Lecco 55.91 68.39 55.67 90.34 90.34 92.49 95.31 62.39 
Livorno 91.19 62.28 63.64 85.80 61.67 64.29 92.06 86.29 
Lodi 91.45 59.66 82.79 96.00 91.60 92.42 95.59 96.45 
Lucca 90.74 74.56 73.50 92.80 65.84 93.12 90.73 82.94 
Macerata 95.43 90.27 89.90 96.10 91.24 91.74 91.48 93.53 
Mantova 86.96 74.66 82.06 91.80 81.31 82.90 83.23 84.33 
Massa-Carrara 92.31 77.17 75.79 92.78 81.00 93.00 91.09 85.05 
Matera 80.77 73.42 76.54 87.95 82.14 83.13 83.33 86.05 
Messina 69.06 56.25 60.09 68.89 89.24 92.38 86.09 90.79 
Milano 67.01 52.15 59.38 85.46 77.33 83.81 83.44 89.49 
Modena 93.53 83.29 84.94 92.71 75.71 76.87 68.96 69.18 




TABLE 3.3 (continued) – Coverage of the sample in terms of branches (percentages) 
PROVINCE 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Novara 77.96 65.96 72.02 68.21 50.76 55.38 51.78 94.50 
Nuoro 93.04 87.07 87.18 95.80 93.33 94.17 93.28 20.69 
Oristano 91.36 84.15 85.37 95.24 92.86 93.98 91.46 27.16 
Padova 86.31 82.49 84.60 94.95 85.18 86.29 86.23 90.40 
Palermo 77.81 69.52 69.11 52.37 87.53 90.58 87.53 93.67 
Parma 87.73 53.24 87.38 93.83 86.67 90.03 88.52 88.44 
Pavia 74.54 45.42 70.03 85.15 77.02 83.44 83.96 94.70 
Perugia 96.40 80.46 82.68 90.08 94.01 90.39 74.22 87.44 
Pesaro Urbino 95.38 93.20 93.44 96.65 90.94 88.38 91.36 80.06 
Pescara 88.14 76.92 47.76 64.03 63.45 63.95 90.67 76.58 
Piacenza 94.48 52.08 82.65 92.54 87.80 91.83 91.83 92.02 
Pisa 92.69 81.14 81.55 59.15 64.05 77.82 77.78 86.69 
Pistoia 94.20 85.23 85.35 89.44 84.52 92.40 94.41 90.76 
Pordenone 71.43 75.00 79.60 95.73 81.40 81.78 82.24 93.09 
Potenza 64.58 51.68 58.28 70.97 65.38 82.69 82.91 84.57 
Prato 85.22 70.49 73.39 87.60 80.30 86.36 86.36 81.20 
Ragusa 79.00 73.79 75.70 71.56 96.30 98.20 98.25 70.34 
Ravenna 94.87 91.10 92.12 97.64 78.95 80.25 78.86 90.09 
Reggio di Calabria 89.92 67.42 66.42 97.78 81.88 81.62 80.43 83.57 
Reggio nell'Emilia 67.38 67.55 72.46 79.55 72.02 73.91 71.96 67.79 
Rieti 98.67 63.64 64.56 83.54 84.81 74.07 86.75 85.54 
Rimini 94.24 88.38 88.79 97.00 82.23 82.54 84.19 76.07 
Roma 81.39 39.92 45.84 71.88 81.17 81.19 81.07 87.41 
Rovigo 83.01 80.00 80.25 89.70 81.98 82.08 81.82 84.18 
Salerno 77.07 68.57 69.44 85.89 74.55 76.40 75.87 76.19 
Sassari 86.17 72.92 71.50 93.91 88.89 90.00 88.35 43.48 
Savona 80.38 60.71 62.35 67.44 71.18 82.86 83.52 93.99 
Siena 93.79 52.78 52.41 95.79 96.92 91.88 97.49 83.82 
Siracusa 67.89 58.33 64.35 64.10 94.78 93.91 91.38 82.79 
Sondrio 86.61 81.42 86.44 64.75 97.46 97.48 97.54 23.20 
Taranto 80.74 58.22 69.93 93.63 74.52 76.40 76.88 82.53 
Teramo 96.35 88.19 89.26 95.48 95.57 95.63 92.31 77.09 
Terni 94.34 75.70 79.28 90.43 90.91 88.43 82.64 98.40 
Torino 78.73 44.58 67.66 81.43 52.61 55.58 58.23 85.31 
Trapani 66.28 66.86 69.32 74.58 92.98 94.35 91.53 97.69 
Trento 85.38 89.38 91.99 96.36 82.27 83.76 81.99 92.60 
Treviso 70.06 78.56 83.25 95.07 73.61 77.29 78.58 92.21 
Trieste 74.02 64.39 66.67 89.78 65.69 68.42 67.18 93.28 
Udine 60.95 67.30 79.13 97.31 82.34 83.48 84.12 95.59 
Varese 79.33 61.63 70.91 81.90 61.77 73.64 83.81 88.40 
Venezia 84.47 75.00 77.26 91.65 84.36 85.71 86.13 86.44 
Verb.-Cusio-Ossola 82.50 69.14 74.70 70.59 57.32 63.75 62.96 91.76 
Vercelli 86.61 71.88 82.95 66.67 57.14 58.65 60.15 89.63 
Verona 90.81 81.70 83.92 91.86 67.62 70.59 71.81 69.65 
Vibo Valentia 94.74 87.18 82.93 97.56 87.80 87.80 85.71 85.71 
Vicenza 85.21 79.21 80.65 96.01 72.79 75.50 75.61 88.63 
Viterbo 88.89 60.11 66.48 80.11 95.77 94.24 94.85 91.79 








When studying the determinants of economic growth with panel techniques, most of 
the authors average the data over non-overlapping sub-periods in order to smooth them 
and reduce the influence of the business cycle on the estimation results. However, this 
approach has been criticized by Attanasio et al. (2000)21 on the ground of several 
reasons. First, averaging does not necessarily eliminate business cycle influences, since 
it could well be the case that economic fluctuations are not synchronized across regions 
or countries; also, there is no guide as to the length of the non-overlapping periods to be 
used for averaging. Second, averaging implies a loss of information and does not allow 
to take into account short-run effects that could offset long-run ones. 
Since market power and the other banking structural variables could have short-run 
as well as long-run effects on growth, we estimate the models using low-frequency 
(annual) data,22 also considering that in our case the averaging approach would not be 
viable due to the unavailability of long time series at a provincial level. 
Table 3.4 lists the sources of the variables needed for the estimation of Equations 
(2) and (9). The value added has been deflated by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) of 
the capital of the region that the province belongs to;23 averages of the monthly series 
have been considered. Yearly averages of the real per capita value added (PCVAD) are 
shown in Figure 3.1. A clear increasing trend emerges, with no evidence of business 
cycle effects in spite of the relatively short time period under consideration. 
Summary statistics of all variables (both estimated and calculated) are reported in Table 
3.5. Overall, PCVAD ranges between 9.65 thousands euro (Crotone in 1999) and 39.91 
thousand euro (Milano in 2006).24 It is worth noting that the first value refers to a 
province located in the South of the country, while the second concerns the leading 
economic and financial province of Italy, which is located in the North. These figures 
are probably emblematic of the long-lasting gap between the North and the South of 
Italy in terms of economic development. Panel (a) of Figure 3.2 helps to have a clearer 
                                                 
21 See also Loayza and Rancière (2006) and Wan et al. (2006).  
22 For an analogous choice regarding studies on growth, see Rosseau and Wachtel (2000), Soto (2003) 
and Hasan et al. (2009). The use of annual data to assess the determinants of growth is also a standard 
practice when dealing with transition countries, for which long economic series are often not available 
(see, for example, Krueger and Ciolko, 1998, and Bennet et al., 2007). 
23 Over the sample period, the CPI at the provincial level was available only for 60 provinces out of 103.  




idea of this aspect by showing the spatial distribution of the averages of PCVAD for the 
whole period 1999-2006. 
As one can easily see, PCVAD reduces moving from the North to the South of Italy, 
and three well defined clusters of provinces can be detected: the first consists of all the 
Northern provinces, whose average PCVAD in most cases exceeds the third quartile of 
the distribution; the second includes the provinces located in the Center of the country, 
with values of PCVAD mainly ranging between the first and the second quartile; finally, 
the third cluster comprises the Southern provinces and the Islands, both characterized 
by very low values of the per capita value added (largely below the first quartile). 
However, it appears that during the period under study this gap could have reduced, 
at least partially. As shown in panel (b) of Figure 3.2, many Southern provinces have 
experienced a significant average growth rate of the valued added over the sample 
period, sometimes comparable to that of other more wealthy areas. 
Levine et al. (2000) have stressed the importance to accurately deflate the variables 
needed to compute the financial development indicator. Since the amount of credit to 
the private sector25 was available on a quarterly basis, we first deflated it using the 
average of the monthly CPI’s of the corresponding quarter, and then computed the 
annual value averaging over quarters. The value added, available on a yearly basis, was 
deflated by means of the averages of the monthly CPI’s. We have been then able to 
calculate our variable FINANCE as the ratio between real credit to private sector and 
real value added.26 
The spatial pattern of this financial development indicator is shown in panel (c) of 
Figure 3.2, and looks very similar to that of PCVAD. Clearly, more developed provinces 
show a higher level of the variable FINANCE, whose values range between 0.22 (Vibo 




                                                 
25 The Bank of Italy provides the geographical distribution (at the provincial level) of banks’ loans 
disaggregated by sector. Our proxy of the credit to the private sector has been set equal to the credit 
granted to private firms, thus excluding that regarding public administration and households. 
26 It is worth to note that our measure of financial development is very similar to the PRIVATE CREDIT 




TABLE 3.4 – Data sources (provincial-level variables) 
Variable Source 
Value added National Institute of Statistic (ISTAT) 
Regional Consumer Price Index (CPI) National Institute of Statistic (ISTAT) 
Population National Institute of Statistic (ISTAT) 
Credit to the private sector Bank of Italy 
Bad loans  Bank of Italy 
Imports National Institute of Statistic (ISTAT) 
Export National Institute of Statistic (ISTAT) 
Students enrolled at secondary schools (1) Ministry of Education, University and Research (MIUR) 
Crimes denounced to the judicial authorities National Institute of Statistic (ISTAT) 










TABLE 3.5 – Descriptive statistics of the sample (province-level variables) 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. 
PCVAD (a) 824 21.3633 21.3155 9.6538 39.9109 5.8570 
GROWTH (b) 721 0.0545 0.0528 -0.1205 0.2011 0.0340 
FINANCE (b) 824 0.5434 0.5297 0.2247 1.3202 0.1775 
LERNER1 (b) 824 0.3425 0.3482 0.1824 0.4767 0.0455 
LERNER2 (b) 824 0.2348 0.2373 0.0862 0.3811 0.0433 
EFF1 (b) 824 0.7808 0.7817 0.6782 0.8371 0.0230 
EFF2 (b) 824 0.9146 0.9180 0.7108 0.9510 0.0211 
BADLOANS (b) 824 0.0808 0.0577 0.0145 0.3326 0.0619 
BRDENS (b) 824 0.1282 0.0822 0.0163 1.2387 0.1509 
TRADE (b) 824 0.3974 0.3824 0.0158 2.2935 0.2607 
HUMCAP (b) 816 0.7312 0.7352 0.5074 0.9390 0.0774 
CRIME (b) 824 0.0362 0.0334 0.0108 0.1326 0.0122 





FIGURE 3.2 – Per capita value added (PCVAD), growth rate (GROWTH) and financial development (FINANCE) – 
Averages 1999 – 2006 
(a) PCVAD  (b) GROWTH  






3.6 Estimation results 
Equation (11) has been estimated by maximum likelihood. Results for both the 
Battese-Coelli and the pooled stochastic frontier models are shown in Table 3.6. Many 
of the estimated parameters are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Starting from the bank-level estimates of cost efficiency scores and Lerner indices, 
we have then calculated the respective provincial-level values, EFFmt and LERNERmt, 
using Expressions (14) and (15). We report the averages of these variables over the 
sample period in Figure 3.3. Considering the results based on the Battese-Coelli model - 
panels (a) and (b) - we can see that the estimated market power of banks located in the 
Northern area of the country is higher. As happened for the per capita value added and 
the financial development index, three clusters of provinces can be therefore detected, 
each largely corresponding to one of the three geographical areas in which Italy is 
usually divided (see also above). A similar conclusion holds when looking at panels (c) 
and (d), which show the same averages obtained from the pooled model.  
However, the two models provide results that are different under some respects, and 
this evidence gives reason for estimating the growth regressions for both. 
As already stressed, Equations (2) and (9) have been estimated by means of the two-
step System GMM method, treating all the right-hand side variables as endogenous and 
using as instruments all the available lags in collapsed form. In computing the standard 
errors, the Windmeijer (2005)’s finite-sample correction has been used.27 We first 
estimate the basic specification, then introduce spatial effects based on each of the three 
weight matrices defined above. Given the potential nonlinearity of the link between 
economic growth and its determinants, natural logarithms of regressors have been 
used.28 Among the explanatory variables, we include the provincial-level values of 
LERNER and EFF, as calculated above.  
Estimation results are presented in Tables 3.7 and 3.8, depending on whether the 
weighted Lerner indices and efficiency scores have been obtained, respectively, from 
the Battese-Coelli model (Model 1) or the pooled model (Model 2).29 
                                                 
27 Estimations have been carried out using the Stata routine xtabond2, provided by Roodman (2006). 
28 Levine et al. (2000) make the same choice. 
29 Note that the estimation results were obtained using 102 provinces (instead of 103), since we were not 




TABLE 3.6 – Maximum likelihood estimates of the cost function 
Battese-Coelli Pooled 
Parameter Regressor 
Coeff. t-value  Coeff. t-value  
α0 Constant 1.2239 5.22 *** 1.2014 4.86 *** 
αQ lnQ 0.9778 51.49 *** 1.0079 78.21 *** 
α1 lnW1 0.2268 4.29 *** 0.1647 2.91 *** 
α2 lnW2 0.6198 11.55 *** 0.7231 12.86 *** 
α3 (= 1–α1–α2) lnW3 0.1535 6.13 *** 0.1122 4.24 *** 
αT lnTREND -0.5156 -3.36 *** -0.5438 -3.14 *** 
αQQ (lnQ)2/2 0.0032 2.19 ** -0.0010 -1.32  
α11 (ln W1)2/2 0.1930 12.49 *** 0.2109 13.87 *** 
α12 lnW1*lnW2 -0.2104 -14.20 *** -0.2282 -15.97 *** 
α13 (= 1–α11–α12) lnW1*lnW3 0.0174 3.32 *** 0.0174 3.28 *** 
α22 (ln W2)2/2 0.2116 13.45 *** 0.2370 15.80 *** 
α23 (= 1–α12–α22) lnW2*lnW3 -0.0012 -0.22  -0.0088 -1.71 * 
α33 (= α11+2α12+α22) (ln W3)2/2 -0.0163 -4.18 *** -0.0086 -2.53 ** 
αTT (lnTREND)2/2 0.1624 2.44 ** 0.2624 3.82 *** 
αQ1 lnQ*lnW1 -0.0038 -1.44  -0.0004 -0.16  
αQ2 lnQ*lnW2 0.0082 2.96 *** -0.0001 -0.05  
αQ3 (= –αQ1–αQ2) lnQ*lnW3 -0.0044 -3.64 *** 0.0005 0.49  
αTQ lnTREND*lnQ -0.0035 -0.89  -0.0002 -0.03  
αT1 lnTREND*lnW1 0.0338 1.94 * 0.0504 2.43 ** 
αT2 lnTREND*lnW2 -0.0540 -3.19 *** -0.0371 -1.85 * 
αT3 (= –αT1–αT2) lnTREND*lnW3 0.0202 2.26 ** -0.0133 -1.30  
Log-likelihood  5241.79  4522.24   
R2  0.9493  0.9895   
N. of observations  4473  4473   
N. of banks  631  631   
Dependent variable: lnC. 
















FIGURE 3.3 – Market power (LERNER) and efficiency (EFF) – Averages 1999 – 2006 
(a) LERNER (b) EFF 





TABLE 3.7 – Estimation results for Model 1 
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N. of observations 714 714  714  714  
N. of provinces 102 102  102  102  
N. of instruments 70 77  77  77  
Dependent variable: PCVAD 
Estimation method: System GMM 
*** = significant at the 1% level ; ** = significant at the 5% level; * = significant at the 10% level. 
All regressors have been instrumented by their second and higher order lags. Instruments matrix has been 
collapsed. Standard errors are based on Windmeijer (2005)’s finite-sample correction. p-values of the tests in 















TABLE 3.8 – Estimation results for Model 2 

























































































































N. of observations 714  714  714  714  
N. of provinces 102  102  102  102  
N. of instruments 70  77  77  77  
Dependent variable: PCVAD 
Estimation method: System GMM 
*** = significant at the 1% level ; ** = significant at the 5% level; * = significant at the 10% level. All regressors 
have been instrumented by their second and higher order lags. Instruments matrix has been collapsed. 
Standard errors are based on Windmeijer (2005)’s finite-sample correction. p-values of the tests in parenthesis.











First we consider the specification without spatial effects (first two columns of the 
tables). Based on the Hansen test, the null hypothesis of validity of the instruments 
cannot be rejected at the usual significance levels in both models. Moreover, there is no 
evidence of second order serial correlation in the difference errors. When significant, all 
coefficients have the expected sign. 
Since the results are broadly similar, in what follows we focus mainly on Model 1. 
The lagged value of the per capita value added is positive and statistically significant at 
the 1% level. Its magnitude (about 0.77) is similar to that estimated by Vaona (2008) for 
the Italian provinces between 1986 and 2003. 
Consistently with most of the previous empirical research, the level of financial 
development (FINANCE), highly significant as well, positively impacts on growth. 
Since all variables are in logarithms, the estimated parameters can be interpreted as 
(short-run) elasticities. Thus, the magnitude of 0.06 for the FINANCE coefficient 
suggests that a 1% increase in the financial development index produces an increase in 
the real per capita value added, on average, of 0.06%. For example, if FINANCE 
increases from of 0.31 (the median value of the corresponding distribution) to 0.43 (the 
third quartile), that is by 38%, the real per capita value added would increase by 2.3%. 
Among the variables included to account for the role of banks in the growth process, 
only LERNER is significant (at the 5% level). Interestingly, the sign of the coefficient is 
positive, meaning that, contrary to the conventional view, a higher market power of 
banks operating in given local economy reveals to be beneficial to growth. In Model 1 
this impact is even larger than that of the financial development. Taking the same 
exercise as before, the estimated parameter of 0.08 implies that if the market power 
increased again by 38% from the median value of 0.35 (i.e. to 0.48), the real per capita 
value added would rise by 3.07%. This finding is coherent with those of Maudos and 
Fernández de Guevara (2006) and Fernández de Guevara and Maudos (2009) for Spain, 
in spite they use a different methodology. 
This result is also highly consistent with the Italian context, where there is a notable 
presence of small firms, usually characterized by information opacity. Our empirical 
evidence indicates that banks’ market power and specific credit relationships may 
represent a decisive factor for making available adequate investment funds to such firms 




As regards the other variables in Model 1, TRADE is significant at the 5% level and 
shows that trade openness has a positive impact on local growth, while the level of 
criminality (CRIME) is inversely related to PCVAD, although its coefficient is different 
from zero only at the 10% level. Both results are somehow expected. The lack of 
significance of the proxy of human capital (HUMCAP) indicates that the level of 
schooling is not a key factor for the growth of provincial value added, in spite of regular 
migration flows from the South to the North of Italy (due to the economic gap between 
the two areas). 
Turning to the estimations with spatial effects, again the Hansen and autocorrelation 
tests do not signal any sort of misspecification. Besides, the spatial autoregressive 
parameter is highly significant whatever the weight matrix is. The positive sign makes 
evident that the growth of a given province benefits from the growth of the surrounding 
local economies. 
However, explicitly adding the spatial effects in our regressions determines that the 
coefficient of the variable FINANCE is no longer significant. Thus, when we control for 
the diffusion and spillover effects, the level of financial development seems not to be 
relevant in explaining economic growth anymore. One possible explanation for this 
evidence is that spatial links among areas are enough to explain local growth rates. In 
more developed areas it is easier to reach adequate levels of economic activity because 
of positive transmission effects among households and firms and, just as a natural 
consequence, financial markets are more developed as well. This would be in line with 
the view of Joan Robinson, according to which “where enterprise leads finance follows” 
(Robinson, 1952, p. 86). In turn, in more depressed regions local communities suffer 
from a negative contagion from the other neighboring, also disadvantaged zones. 
Quite to contrary, the positive impact of banks’ market power on growth is 
confirmed, being statistically significant at least at 5% level in all specifications, and 
again stresses the importance of regulating banking competition in order to boost 
provincial economies. 
We can therefore conclude that improving local economic growth in Italy requires 
especially the establishment and preservation of longstanding relationships between 




their investment projects. This is particularly true for small firms, given their difficulties 
in accessing to capital markets. 
 
 
3.7 Summary and conclusions 
In this paper we have tried to contribute to the literature on financial development 
and growth from a regional perspective by accounting explicitly for both the role of 
banks and the possible diffusion and spillover effects among local economies, the latter 
aspect being largely overlooked in the literature on the finance-growth nexus. Using a 
dataset on Italian provinces for the period 1999-2006, we have estimated two dynamic 
panel models – both without and with spatial effects – using GMM techniques. 
Our findings are of considerable importance for at least two reasons. First, we 
discover a positive, robust and statistically significant link between market power and 
economic growth. This gives support to the view according to which bank competition 
can be harmful to growth especially when it reduces the credit availability for 
informationally opaque (usually small) firms, i.e. when the local economy calls for 
specific and long-lasting credit relationships with firms. Such a landscape well portrays 
the Italian productive system, where the role of small-sized firms is quite important. 
Second, the positive role of financial development in promoting growth, which is a 
customary evidence in many cross-country studies, is not confirmed when we control 
for spatial effects. This means that for local areas it is easier to grow especially when 
they belong to more vital territories, which should also involve, as a natural corollary, 
well developed financial backgrounds. 
We conclude that local economic growth is affected not so much by the amount of 
credit, as by the establishment of longstanding relationships between banks and firms, 
which allow the latters to count on durable credit provisions for their productive 
investments. However, growing is more difficult in less dynamic contexts. 
Although further research about this topic is surely needed, our findings cast some 
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